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HISTORICISM, PROGRESS, AND THE REDEMPTIVE
CONSTITUTION
Amy Kapczynski*
From what are phenomena rescued? Not just or not so much from
the ill-repute and contempt into which they 've fallen, but from the
catastrophe when a certain form of transmission often presents them in
terms of their "value as heritage "-they are rescued by exhibiting the
discontinuity that exists within them. There is a kind of transmission
that is a catastrophe.
-Walter Benjamin**
It is frequently said that there is a necessary relationship between
constitutionalism and history. As Stephen Griffin has written,
"[c]onstitutional interpretation is always backward-looking .... It
draws on the past in order to provide legal authority to the present. Even
as it abstracts from historical context, then, constitutional interpretation
is dependent on it for its status as law."1 To say this is to make two
* Post-Doctoral Fellow in Law and Public Health, Yale Law School. J.D. 2003, Yale Law
School. This Article has benefited enormously from the generous comments of many people, to
whom I owe a deep debt of gratitude. In particular, I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Jack
Balkin, Susan Gillespie, Serena Mayeri, Robert Post, Reva Siegel, and the editors of Cardozo
Law Review. All errors, needless to say, are my own.
.* Walter Benjamin, N [Re the Theory of Knowledge; Theory of Progress], in BENJAMIN:
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AESTHETICS 43, 63 (Leigh Hafrey & Richard Sieburth trans. & Gary
Smith ed., 1983).
1 Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2129 (1999);
see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34 (1991) ("[T]he Constitution is
more than an idea. It is an evolving historical practice, constituted by generations of Americans
as they mobilized, argued, resolved their ongoing disputes over the nation's identity and
destiny."); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage. The United States Supreme Court and the Uses
of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 268 (1988) ("History is often intrinsic to constitutional
adjudication, providing the initial assumptions, the thought structure, the terms of discourse, the
backdrop of human experience, or all of these, for many instances of constitutional
adjudication."). Other commentators point out that not just constitutional law, but law as a
whole, is fundamentally backward-looking. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF
LAW 43 (1999) (contending that the "historicity of law is its single most prominent feature");
Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1023
(1997). Gordon writes:
For lawyers the past is primarily a source of authority-if we interpret it correctly, it
will tell us how to conduct ourselves now. History is not only a source of authority but
of legitimacy: It reassures us that what we do now flows continuously out of our past,
out of precedents, traditions, fidelity to statutory and Constitutional texts and
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related claims. The first one is that constitutions have an ineluctable
relationship to history, because they arrive to us from the past.2 The
second one is that constitutions always face a question of legitimacy
that is also a question of history: How can this text from the past have
legitimacy and authority over the people today?3 One foundational
question of constitutional interpretation, then, is: How can we provide
an account of constitutional meaning that reconciles the historicity of
the Constitution with its present day legitimacy?
Accepting that we must think historically if we want to think
constitutionally, and that we must, when thinking historically, also
account for the present day legitimacy of the Constitution, what kind of
history should we practice? This Article is concerned with
constitutional historiography, which is to say, the question of how
theorists, lawyers, and judges elaborate the past in constitutional
context. How ought we conceive of and investigate constitutional
history and the backward-looking development of meaning that U.S.
constitutionalism is based upon?
To explore these questions, this Article draws upon the writings of
the Frankfurt School theorist Walter Benjamin, who thought a great deal
meanings.
Id. One can also look to doctrine to support this claim, since much of what judges and Justices do
when they disagree about the Constitution is disagree about history. See William E. Nelson,
History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1987) ("The United
States Supreme Court has long understood that the task of constitutional analysis requires
historical research to discover the meaning imparted to constitutional provisions by those who
enacted them."). To offer just a few out of many possible examples of cases that turn on
approaches to the constitutional past, consider Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992) (separation of powers); and Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-75 (1991) (Eighth Amendment). See also LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 69-70 (1996) (discussing the use of history in the
Warren Court's jurisprudence).
2 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1026 ("Every legal text is a historical artifact that must be
brought into the present in order to be applied."). The importance of the past to contemporary
meaning, and particularly linguistic meaning, is discussed in Part I, infra.
3 As Jed Rubenfeld puts the problem, "[d]emocratic freedom is conceived essentially as
governance by the will of the actual people of the here and the now. As a result, a text that resists
this present will becomes a deviance, a democratic scandal, a problem forever demanding and
forever escaping explanation." JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 11 (2001). The question
of how the Constitution's democratic aspect and its historical aspect can be reconciled has been
one of the most generative and important questions for constitutional theorists in recent decades.
It also underpins many recent major works in constitutional law. For example, Rubenfeld's
theory of paradigm cases is an effort to answer it, see supra, as is Ackerman's theory of the
dualist constitution, see ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3-33. This same question is at the root of
Alexander Bickel's articulation of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which Bickel defines as
the fact that judicial review can "thwart[] the will of representatives of the actual people of the
here and now." See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962). The
question of judicial review and the question of constitutionalism can in principle be separated, of
course, but they are emphatically run together in contemporary American constitutional
discourse. The judge becomes the bearer of the Constitution's historical aspect, its ability to
connect articulations in the past with the circumstances of the present.
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about the concept of history, but little, if at all, about constitutionalism.
By exploring Benjamin's concept of history, and his understanding of
the three different methodological approaches to history that he
postulates-historicism, progressivism, and redemptivism-1 hope to
make more visible some of the ways that we think about constitutional
history, and some of the effects that these modalities have on our
present day constitutional order. My project here is to add to our
understanding of constitutional practices, and to make visible the
dangers of the most common methodologies through which
constitutional thinkers approach the past. One central supposition of
this Article-one that I will defend throughout its course-is that our
view of history strongly influences our ability to understand and react to
the needs of the present.
Benjamin's concept of history is rooted in a categorical distinction
between that which is "past" and that which is "historical." The past is
all that has happened before. History, in contrast, is an interpretive act,
or a kind of language, one in which we make meaning by juxtaposing
moments of the past and present. Benjamin argues that we create
history in relation to the past in the same way that we create
constellations out of stars. The past is an "index"; it is the stuff of
history, but it does not resemble it.
This underlying concept of history grounds Benjamin's attempt to
define and criticize what he understood to be the two dominant
approaches towards history at the time he was writing: historicism and
progressivism. The historicist methodology seeks to understand each
moment in the past objectively, on its own terms, and write authoritative
histories by relying upon official sources. Benjamin has two main
criticisms of historicism. He contends, first, that it is not possible to
know history scientifically, without influence from the present, or
objectively, through the mere accumulation of facts. For Benjamin,
history is always an act of construction, and no single or final answer
can be given to any truly historical question. What we make of the past
depends upon the interest that we take in it-an interest that is
inevitably driven by the needs of today. Benjamin's second objection is
that historicism in fact sympathizes with those he called the "victors" of
history, and abandons most of the past (such as the past that has not
been codified in official documents) as irrelevant. Historicism thus
generates histories that claim neutrality but in fact justify the status quo.
Benjamin is equally critical, however, of progressives: those who
see the flaws of historicism and conclude that they ought to train their
gaze on the future rather than the past. The progressive view of history,
which Benjamin associated primarily with the Social Democratic Party
in Germany between the World Wars, portrays history as a process of
continual and inevitable improvement. Progressivism adopts a soft
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focus, always privileging a narrative of improvement over elements of
the past or present that disrupt this view. Benjamin rejects
progressivism for two reasons. First, cutting ourselves off from the past
threatens to make us complacent, because it undermines our ability to
see and feel danger in both the past and present. Second, if we insist
that the past is truly transcended, we blind ourselves to historical forces
that continue to shape the present, and consequently we will fail to
understand these forces when we meet them again in a different guise.
Benjamin thinks that another relation to the past is possible, one
governed by the faithless practice of redemption, rather than a faith-
based embrace of tradition or progress. Imagine sundering the act of
history from the concept of time as a progression, or the past as a sui
generis authority: that is Benjamin's challenge to us. View the present
not as a moment on a timeline, but rather as a moment of agency and
possibility. There is no continuum of time, Benjamin insists; there is
only an eternal present, and, within that, historical acts that coalesce
now and then to render visible historical forces and contemporary
dangers and possibilities. Although we commonly associate the notion
of redemption with a duty to the past, and the desire to make the broken
whole again, this is not the driving force of Benjamin's theory of
redemption. Benjamin is concerned primarily for the living, for our
ability to act and experience today. It is through a relation to the past
that we experience emotions like happiness or anger that drive us to act
in the present. We should engage in redemptive acts not because we
can make the past whole-for we cannot-but because this is the best
way to make visible the forces that continue to produce injustice today,
and motivate us to change them.
What does all of this have to do with the U.S. Constitution? I
contend that the two approaches towards the past that Benjamin
criticizes, historicism and progressivism, dominate contemporary U.S.
constitutional practice and theory. Benjamin's writings can help us
understand the shortcomings of these tendencies, and articulate a third
possible relationship with our past, one governed not by tradition or
progress, but by redemption. These modes of constitutional history4 can
be differentiated along three axes: temporality, agency, and legitimacy.
Constitutional historicism is preoccupied with returning to the past.
Its privileged location of constitutional agency is in the people and
events that came before us. Its paradigmatic act of authority is one of
fidelity to meanings developed or agreed upon in the past. This mode
of history reconciles the historicity and present day legitimacy of the
4 1 call these "modes of history" to try to avoid the temptation to fully personify them, or
ascribe to them strict methodological boundaries. Although some theorists might be described as
"historicist," "progressive," and "redemptive," many theorists will make claims that sound in one
or more modes at different times, or that hover at the edges of one or more of these ideal types.
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Constitution with reference to notions of consent or majoritarian
tradition. We the People now ought to be governed by We the People
then because the greater number of us agreed to meanings to which we
must now be held, or abided by traditions that indelibly define who we
are as a People. The historicist Constitution claims to be legitimate
because it is Our Will or Our Tradition. An interpretation of that will or
tradition is legitimate because it can be certain. It must discover, and
ensure that we do not stray from, what has been.
Progressivism describes another tendency of contemporary
constitutional history, one that is preoccupied not with the past but with
the future. It locates agency in the movement of history itself, and
posits that history will be guided in the direction of a brighter, more
free, and more equal future by the processes established by our
Constitution. The progressive Constitution is legitimate because it can
always improve itself, and because nothing in its history or text
seriously compromises that possibility. We the People now ought to
abide by it not because it offers us a link to tradition or consent, but
because it is a vehicle for progress. Progressivism views the
constitutional past as a rising rather than fixed star. History, here, is a
story of linear or spiral advance, and the present is always, on average,
more free than the past. Progressive narratives do not view the failures
of our historical Constitution as evidence that the document is or ever
was "evil."'5 Instead, they distance themselves from these failures,
insisting that our past mistakes can truly be surpassed, and that the
document will slowly but steadily work itself pure.
Redemptive constitutionalism is occupied with the time of the
present, or as Benjamin would call it, the Jetztzeit.6 Its privileged locus
of constitutional agency and authority is the present. It adopts a critical
stance towards history, seeking to uncover discontinuities within
historical narratives. Redemptive narratives use history not firmly to
bound constitutional interpretation, but openly to rewrite history, and
insist upon the continual need to do so. Redemptivist thought turns to
history as a mode of meaning-making, one that takes its impetus from
the present, but remains faithful to the facticity of the past, that is, to its
capacity to serve as a secret index of meaning. Redemptivists are
concerned with constitutional paths not taken, with the necessity of
constitutional "countermemory, ' '7 and with radically expanding the
range of constitutional sources that are permitted to contribute to our
5 1 take the term from Jack Balkin's discussion of "constitutional evil," in his article
Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1997).
6 1 elaborate on Benjamin's use of this term in Part IV, infra.
7 Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction,
and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). Spaulding's notion of
countermemory is discussed further in Part IV, infra.
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understanding of the present. Rather than attribute authority to past
legislators or majorities, they understand authority and legitimacy as
fundamentally contemporary phenomena, properties that must always
be created and recreated, and that can be disrupted or consolidated
through the construction of redemptive constitutional images. They are
possessed with the importance of remembering constitutional tragedies,
and of resisting our strong desire to repress or forget the injustices and
failures of our past. The redemptive Constitution reconciles the text's
historical aspect with its present day legitimacy not by claiming that the
past is fixed and can be returned to, or by claiming that it is dead and
can be left behind, but rather, by claiming that it can be redeemed; that
we can use the past to better understand the present, to break apart
traditional narratives that blind us to possibilities of both transcendence
and disaster.
Benjamin's theory of history offers several profound criticisms of
constitutional progressivism and historicism. Both of these modes, he
suggests, are in the grip of a false view of history. Historicists assume
that the historical act has value because it can produce certainty and
authority, but they are wrong that historical interpretations can either be
final or carry their own authority. Progressives are wrong to
hypostatize their belief in mankind's eternal advance, and to disavow
anything that does not fit this preordained vision. The consequences of
these errors, Benjamin insists, are grave: Both the historicist and
progressive modes of thought serve to anesthetize the present. They do
so by assigning constitutional agency to some other time, and
constructing narratives of heritage or progress that suppress the conflict
and dissension in the past and today.
A redemptive mode of history, Benjamin asserts, is based in a
more sound understanding of the nature of the historical act. It is also
more responsive to the needs of the present. It offers critical powers of
perception that enable us to see the dangers or possibilities of the
moment, and to question the historical narratives that have been handed
down as authoritative. It also offers an account of how we can engage
the past, respecting its facticity without turning our agency over to it.
From the past we can take meaning and motivation, and a power to
imagine and reimagine the forces that occupy the present.
Part I of the Article elaborates upon Benjamin's theory of history,
and the categorical difference he draws between past facts and the
histories that interpret them. Part II discusses his criticisms of
historicism, and relates these to the dominant methodology of
constitutional history today, constitutional historicism. Part III explains
Benjamin's critique of the concept of progress, and applies this critique
to a second tendency in current constitutional thought, constitutional
progressivism. Part IV articulates the concept of constitutional
1046 [Vol. 26:3
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redemptivism, which offers us a way to understand our constitutional
past as something other than tradition that must be carried forward, or as
irrelevant because already overcome. Part V evaluates the dangers and
capacities of these three approaches to history, and concludes that the
redemptive approach to constitutional history is the most responsive to
both the present and past, and is both compatible with and even
necessary to constitutional interpretation today.
I. BENJAMIN'S THEORY OF HISTORY
Walter Benjamin, a writer to whom everything-including fame-
seemed to come belatedly, was described by Hannah Arendt as "the
most important critic of [his] time." 8 A German Jew born in 1892,
Benjamin did most of his writing between the World Wars, and the era
in which he lived was central to his thought. Paradoxically, the event
that gives the most relevant context for Benjamin's life and writings
may be his tragic death: In 1940, forced to flee the Nazis, who had
confiscated his Paris apartment and manuscripts, Benjamin tried to
cross the Franco-Spanish border on foot but was denied entry into
Spain.9 Certain that he would be returned to France and sent to a death
camp, in despair, Benjamin took his own life.' 0 According to Arendt,
had Benjamin traveled one day earlier or later, he would have
successfully crossed the border: "Only on that particular day was the
catastrophe possible.""
Benjamin was an essayist and thinker whose writings resist easy
categorization. He thought of himself first and foremost as a literary
critic,' 2 but he was closely affiliated with the historical materialists of
the Frankfurt School, the most well-known member of which is
probably Benjamin's disciple, Theodor Adorno. 13 Benjamin's writings
have been the object of intense recent interest within contemporary
literary and cultural studies, but for this Article, it is his concept of
history that is of moment, because it provides insight into current modes
8 Hannah Arendt, Introduction to Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940, in WALTER BENJAMIN,
ILLUMINATIONS 1, 14 (Harry Zohn trans. & Hannah Arendt ed., 1968) [hereinafter
ILLUMINATIONS].
9 Id. at 18.
10 Id. Benjamin's brother, Georg Benjamin, was in almost uninterrupted police detention
from 1933, and was eventually sent to the Mauthausen death camp, where he died in 1942. See
Anson Rabinbach, Introduction to THE CORRESPONDENCE OF WALTER BENJAMIN AND
GERSHOM SCHOLEM, 1932-1940 xxxiii (Gary Smith & Andre Lefevre trans. & Gershom Scholem
ed., 1989).
11 Arendt, supra note 8, at 18.
12 Id. at 4.
13 Id. at 2.
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of constitutional historiography that share much in common with the
objects of his critique.
Benjamin's most sustained meditation on history was his famous
"Theses on the Philosophy of History", 14 fifteen pages written in 1940
in response to the Hitler-Stalin pact.' 5 It is perhaps remarkable that
Benjamin responded to the march of Fascism with an essay on history,
but this is in fact quite revealing: For Benjamin, only the correct
approach to history would allow his contemporaries to see and react to
the danger of the moment in which they were living.
As Arendt understood, for Benjamin, the "question of the past and
of tradition was decisive."' 6 At the center of Benjamin's concept of
history is an insistence on a rigorous distinction between that which is
"past" and that which is "historical." For Benjamin, the past must be
understood as comprised of every event, without differentiation between
"major and minor."' 7 The true historian understands, therefore, that
"nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for
history."' 8 The past thus resembles the Freudian unconscious: it
constitutes an archive of everything that has ever happened, large and
small, and can be accessed from or emerge into the consciousness of the
present, but can never in human time or mind be made conscious in all
of its fullness. Benjamin's convictions are influenced by his readings of
Freud and Proust on the unconscious and memory: for both writers,
according to Benjamin, experience, especially traumatic experience,
happens retrospectively, when an event is integrated into consciousness,
rather than in the moment, when it either passes us by or overwhelms
us.19 Benjamin asserts that there is no such thing as an immediate
experience of an object or event. He quotes the Eighteenth Century
economist Turgot: "By the time we have come to discover that things
are at a given juncture, they have already changed several times. Hence
14 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
253. The German title, "Ober den Begriffder Geschichte," might be better translated as "On the
Concept of History," or even (playing on the fact that Begriff, or "concept," derives from the
word greifen, to grasp) as "Grasping History." This last version would best capture what I will
argue is the most central aspect of Benjamin's concept of history: the notion that it must be
actively grasped in the present, rather than simply perceived or discovered.
15 See Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin and His Angel, in ON WALTER BENJAMIN 51, 81 -
82 (Gary Smith ed., 1988).
16 Arendt, supra note 8, at 37.
17 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
254.
18 Id.
19 See Walter Benjamin, A Berlin Chronicle, in ONE WAY STREET 293, 343 (Edmund
Jephcott & Kingsley Shorter trans., 1979) ("It is to this immolation of our deepest self in shock
that our memory owes its most indelible images.") [hereinafter ONE WAY STREET]; see also
WALTER BENJAMIN, CHARLES BAUDELAIRE 113-16 (Harry Zohn trans., 1997) (discussing the
work of both Proust and Freud); Susan Sontag, Introduction to ONE WAY STREET, supra, at 6, 12
(noting that Benjamin translated some of Proust's works).
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we always perceive events too late and politics must always foresee, as
it were, the present. '20 The same could be said of history.
The past, in Benjamin's thought, has no fixed relation to time-his
conception of the past thus again reveals its similarity to the Freudian
unconscious. It is to be understood not as a linear and temporal
progression, but as an index: "The past carries with it a [secret] index by
which it is referred to redemption."' 21 By "index" Benjamin means not
an ordered archive, but, drawing from the Latin, "an informer, sign,
inscription. ' 22 The past is a disordered series of signs or inscriptions in
which we can find meaning, which point us towards something but
which are not themselves the things that we seek, or the objects in
which we will find meaning.
To speak historically is therefore not to recite the past, or compile
it, or articulate causal relationships between one past event and another.
Benjamin writes:
No fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became
historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be
separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as
his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the
beads of a rosary. 23
Benjamin's claim is precise: he does not contend that there are not
events that actually occurred in the past, or that no events are actually
"causes" of others. He insists instead that to recite past events as if they
are related through time or cause is not to articulate them "historically."
To think historically, one must bring together past and present with
reference not to their place in time or causal connections, but instead in
their capacity to mean and make sense, to be citable and recognizable as
a concern of today:
The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as an
image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and
is never seen again.... For every image of the past that is not
recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to
disappear irretrievably.24
20 Walter Benjamin, N [Re the Theory of Knowledge; Theory of Progress], in BENJAMIN:
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AESTHETICS 43, 70 (Leigh Hafrey & Richard Sieburth trans. & Gary
Smith ed., 1983) [hereinafter BENJAMIN].
21 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
254. The words in brackets are my modification of Harry Zohn's translations. I will use them to
denote this throughout the article. For a discussion of some of the problems with Zohn's
translation, see Lloyd Spencer, On Certain Difficulties with the Translation of On the Concept of
History, available at http://www.tasc.ac.uk/depart/media/staff/ls/WBenjamin/TranslWB.html.
22 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). •
23 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
263.
24 Id. at 255.
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We create historical meaning by bringing past events together in a
constructive and interpretive act. Historical meaning is not discovered,
but made, in a creative articulation that brings past events together with
present circumstances in order to make meaning through their relation,
thereby making the past relevant to the present. The past therefore only
becomes historical "posthumously."
The true historian, Benjamin says, constructs "constellations" out
of past events: he "grasps the constellation which his own era has
formed with a definite earlier one. ' 25 The image of the constellation is
key to Benjamin's concept of history, and it is worth taking a moment
to consider it. Stars in a constellation do not relate through rubrics of
age or distance; they are instead given meaning by the images we create
with reference to their points. It is our perspective on the stars, not their
absolute relation to one another, that is relevant to the images we make
of them. Further, individual stars in a constellation do not foreordain or
often even approximate the image that the constellation will take, and it
is never clear what constellation will emerge from each new effort to
read the stars. This image of the constellation also foregrounds the
strong distinction that Benjamin believes exists between the domain of
facts and the domain of interpretation, something I will return to in Part
II.
Benjamin also refers to history as a linguistic category: he writes
that the place that one "happens upon" historical images is in
language. 26 By this he means to invoke the same form of relation that
the image of the constellation calls forth. As Paul de Man has written,
history, for Benjamin, "pertains strictly to the order of language," 27
which is to say, "history ... [is] interlinguistic: [it] relate[s] to what in
the original belongs to language, and not to meaning as an
extralinguistic correlate susceptible of paraphrase and imitation. '28 To
say that history relates to that aspect of the past that belongs to language
is like noting that constellations relate to a very particular capacity of
stars: their capacity to form images with one another. Constellations, in
fact, describe nothing else about stars. They do not represent them so
much as speak them. It is in this way that we can say that constellations
do not transmit stars as objects, and that history does not transmit the
25 Id. at 263. Note that some of the stars in the constellation, according to this quote, come
from our own epoch-a notion that seems to disrupt the metaphor of the constellation, until we
realize that Benjamin does not think that we understand the past from the "present" exactly.
Rather, we construct history from the place Benjamin calls the Jetztzeit, or a place of actuality
that understands itself as outside of the linear conception of time. I discuss Benjamin's concept
of the Jetztzeit in detail in Part IV, infra.
26 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 49.
27 Paul De Man, "Conclusions " Walter Benjamin 's "The Task of the Translator, "Messenger
Lecture, Cornell University, March 4, 1983, 1985 YALE FRENCH STUD. 25, 44.
28 Id. at 36.
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past as a series of events. Rather, both history and constellations
express only that aspect of their objects that is susceptible to language.
The sheer accumulation or recounting of the past is thus not historical,
in the same way that a dictionary is not a sentence, although both are
made up of words. What is historical is the act of drawing past and
present together to enable them to say something today, to "supply a
unique experience with the past. 29
The central act of the historian is one of imagination, rather than
recitation or excavation: it is construction, not reconstruction. 30 History
is also, importantly, less an act of writing than an act of imagining; its
result is not a narrative, but a historical image. 31 It should now be
possible to understand in more depth Benjamin's insistence that nothing
that has ever happened should be considered "lost to history," and his
enigmatic assertion that there is a "secret [engagement] between past
generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth.
Like every generation that preceded us, we have been [imparted] with a
weak messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That
claim cannot be settled cheaply. '32
29 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
262.
30 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 60 ("For the materialist historian, it is
important to distinguish the construction of a historical state of affairs very rigorously from what
one generally calls its 'reconstruction.' 'Reconstruction' by means of empathy is one-sided.
'Construction' presupposes 'destruction."').
31 Id. at 67 ("History breaks down into images, not into stories."); Walter Benjamin, Theses
on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at 255 ("The past can be seized
only as an image which flashes up .... ). According to Pierre Missac, a French scholar who
knew Benjamin and wrote extensively about his work, "[o]ne cannot repeat too often that the
image is one of the first and original sources of Benjamin's mode of thought .. " PIERRE
MISSAC, WALTER BENJAMIN'S PASSAGES 110 (Sheirry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1995). By
describing the historical product as an image rather than a narrative, Benjamin emphasizes the
freedom and agency of both the historian and reader of history: an image is less constraining than
a narrative, and always foregrounds its own need for interpretation. The German word for image
that Benjamin uses is Bild, which, in verb form (bilden), means to generate or to constitute. His
use of the notion of the Bild thus carries with it a resonance of construction rather than retelling,
much the same way that, in the English, the noun "image" borrows something from the verb "to
imagine." An image also has no beginning or end, and does not impose a particular sequence or
temporality of encounter upon the reader. The concept of the image thus far better approximates
Benjamin's understanding of the historical product than does the concept of the narrative.
Furthermore, by picturing history as an image, rather than narrative, Benjamin emphasizes his
rejection of teleological notions of time and futurity that many associate with the historical act.
As Susan Sontag writes, "[t]ime does not give one much leeway: it thrusts us forward from
behind, blows us through the narrow funnel of the present into the future. But space [and here I
would add, image] is broad, teeming with possibilities, positions, intersections, passages, detours,
U-turns, dead ends, one-way streets." Sontag, supra note 19, at 13. Benjamin's reasons for his
rejection of the attempt to impose a teleology upon history will become clear in Part III infra,
when I discuss his critique of the concept of progress.
32 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
254.
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What is the nature of this claim that the past has upon us?
Benjamin describes it as both libidinal and linguistic:
Reflection shows us that our image of happiness is thoroughly
colored by the time to which our own existence has consigned us.
The kind of happiness that could inspire envy in us exists only in the
air we have breathed, among people we could have talked to, women
who could have given themselves to us. In other words, our vision
of happiness ineluctably resonates with redemption. The image of
the past with which history is concerned behaves in the same way.
The past carries with it a secret index by which it is referred to
redemption. Aren't we caressed by a breath of air that surrounded
those before us? Don't the voices to which we lend our ears
reverberate with an echo of others that have fallen silent? Don't the
women that we court have sisters whom they did not get to know? If
so, then there is a secret engagement between past generations and
our own.
33
The claim that the past has upon us "refers us to redemption" in two
ways. First, it refers us in language, in the "voices to which we lend our
ears," and the dead with whom those voices resonate. Benjamin wrote
extensively about language and its necessarily collective and historical
qualities. Language arrives to us-or maybe more accurately, we come
to language-in history, and through others.34  We cannot help but
invoke the past when we speak, and this is one aspect of its claim upon
us. Second, the past has a claim upon us because it structures our
libidinal life. Our sense of happiness, envy, hatred, and sacrifice all
relate solely to the past in Benjamin's view.35 Benjamin would also say,
I think, that the past structures our sense of justice.
33 Walter Benjamin, Uber den Begriff der Geschichte, in 1 WALTER BENJAMIN,
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 693, 693-94 (Rolf Tiedemann & Hermann Schweppenhaiiser eds.,
1977) [hereinafter GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN]; see also Walter Benjamin, Theses on the
Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at 253-54. 1 have offered my own
translation here, one that borrows heavily from Zohn's-in part because the German version of
the "Theses" in Benjamin's Gesammelte Schriften includes several sentences that are not in the
Zohn translation.
34 That is, the domain of nomination is something that we inherit from others, rather than
create or intend. As Giorgio Agamben points out, drawing upon some of Walter Benjamin's
work on language, "[s]ince humans can receive names-which always precede them-only
through transmission, the access to this fundamental dimension of language is mediated and
conditioned by history. Speaking beings do not invent names...." GIORGIO AGAMBEN,
POTENTIALITIES 1, 49-50 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans. & ed., 1999). These names are what
Wittgenstein called "simple signs," those elements of language that must be explained to us in
order for us to understand them. Id. at 50. Thus "[t]he historical condition of human beings is
inseparable from their condition as speaking beings; it is inscribed in the very mode of their
access to language." Id. at 51.
35 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
260 (noting that the "hatred and [the] the spirit of sacrifice ... are nourished by the image of
enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren").
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Benjamin here offers a strictly presentist view of the past's claim
upon us. He insists that we inevitably relate ourselves to the past
through language, and through our libidinal life. We do not, on this
account, owe the past itself anything. At moments, Benjamin espouses
a more theological, less presentist view, suggesting that the living can
and should seek to make previously "complete [suffering] into
something incomplete," 36 and save the dead.37 But he is inconsistent in
his theologism. His most unequivocal statements present history as
utterly opposed to a theology that sees historical agency as divine rather
than manmade. 38 But he also writes that the concept of the experience,
which, as discussed above, Benjamin understood in Freudian terms, 39
"forbids us to conceive of history as thoroughly a-theological, even
though we barely dare not attempt to write it according to literally
theological concepts. '40 We can reconcile these two statements by
understanding them to apply to different aspects of the concept of
theology and redemption. If we experience things retroactively, as
Benjamin believed, then there is a way in which action in the present
can affect the past, insofar as it can affect that past that continues to
live, in experience, today. Thus, Benjamin can argue both that we can
affect the past, and that our duty and desire to do so comes from the
present. But Benjamin is also insistently opposed to theological
thinking where it posits a divine actor, or the prospect of complete
redemption, as we will discuss further in Part III.
II. AGAINST HISTORICISM
Benjamin believed that true historical practice differed in critical
ways from the two dominant approaches toward history at the time he
was writing: historicism and progressivism. To understand what
Benjamin meant by historicism, it helps to consider the thought of the
36 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 61.
37 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
255 ("[E]ven the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins.").
38 Thus Benjamin wrote:
Only the messiah himself puts an end to history, in the sense that it frees,
completely fulfills the relationship of history to the messianic. Therefore,
nothing that is truly historical can want to relate by its own volition to the
messianic. Therefore the kingdom of God is not the telos of the dynamics
of history, it cannot be posited as its aim; seen historically it is not its aim
but its end.
De Man, supra note 27, at 45 (quoting and translating from Benjamin's Theological
and Political Fragment, in WALTER BENJAMIN, REFLECTIONS 312, 314 (Edmund
Jephcott trans. & Peter Demetz ed., 1978) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS]).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
40 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 61.
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man that Benjamin holds forth as the chief exemplar of the movement:
the renowned nineteenth century German historian Leopold von Ranke.
Commonly referred to as the founder of the modem science of
history, Ranke is credited by historians with mapping a new direction
for their discipline. Ranke's methodology was based upon "the critical
study of [historical] sources and upon the organization of these sources
into a hierarchy with its apex in the original document contemporary
with the historicized event, as close as possible to the historical actor
and as distant as possible from the historian. '41 His written works were
predominantly histories of the major European nations, because he
believed that states represented "spiritual forces" through which one
could observe the movement of history.42 In the interaction and conflict
of these European states, Ranke believed, lay the secret of world
history, which it was his greatest ambition to write.43
The innovations wrought by Ranke's method can only be
understood against the approach he sought to overthrow, the
philosophical-historical tradition of German Idealism. 44  Ranke
criticized Idealists for subsuming history into philosophy, and
subordinating the past to their philosophical theory of progress.45
Ranke insisted, instead, that "every epoch is immediate to God, '46 and
had to be understood on its own terms. 47 The way to do this, according
to Ranke, was for the historian to devote himself solely to facts which
41 LEONARD KRIEGER, RANKE: THE MEANING OF HISTORY 2 (1977).
42 Georg G. Iggers & Konrad von Moltke, The Idealistic Theory of the State, in LEOPOLD
VON RANKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY 61, 62 (Georg G. Iggers & Konrad von
Moltke eds., 1973) [hereinafter THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY].
43 Id.
44 Prominent German Idealists included G.W.F. Hegel and Johann Gottlieb Fichte.
45 For example, he rejected Fichte's assertion that "'[r]emaining freely within the limits of
philosophy without regard for any experience, [the philosopher] must be able to a priori...
describe all of time and all its possible epochs .... ' Leopold von Ranke, On the Character of
Historical Science (Wilma A. Iggers trans.), in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY, supra
note 42, at 35 (quoting Fichte).
46 Id. at 53. Ranke took theological exception to the Idealist notion of progress:
If in contradiction to the view expressed here, however, one were to assume that this
progress consisted in the very fact that the life of mankind reaches a higher potential in
every epoch-that is, that every generation surpasses the previous one completely and
that therefore the last epoch is always the preferred, the epochs preceding it being only
stepping stones to ones that follow this would be an injustice on the part of the deity.
Id. Despite this insistence, Ranke believed that the facts of history supported a narrative of
"progressive world-historical movement." Ernst Schulin, Universal History and National
History, Mainly in the Lectures of Leopold von Ranke, in LEOPOLD VON RANKE AND THE
SHAPING OF THE HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE 70, 81 (Georg G. Iggers & James M. Powell eds.,
1990) [hereinafter RANKE AND SHAPING HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE].
47 The fact that each era was immediate before God did not mean that each ought to be of
equal interest to the historian; in fact, "[n]ot unlike Hegel, [Ranke] is concerned only with periods
of world historical significance. Similarly, he is interested only in the world historical peoples,
which in the modern period populate the great European nations. His universal history is thus,
strictly speaking, the history of Western civilization." Georg G. Iggers & Konrad von Moltke,
The Prefaces, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY, supra note 42, at 132.
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could be found in official or authoritative documents. 48 "History first
begins," he wrote,
at the point where monuments become intelligible and documentary
evidence of a trustworthy character is forthcoming, but from this
point onward her domain is boundless. Universal
history... embraces the events of all times and nations, with this
limitation only: that they shall be so far ascertained as to make a
scientific treatment of them possible. 49
Ranke is credited with "the most famous statement in all of
historiography, '50 to which, as we will see, Benjamin refers: "To history
has been given the function of judging the past, of instructing the men
for the profit of future years. The present attempt does not aspire to
such a lofty undertaking; it merely wants to show [what actually
happened]."' 5' Ranke was adamant that neither the present, nor the
subjectivity of the historian could be allowed to influence historical
practice. 52 His was an attempt to discern history "objectively," which
meant that the true historian sought, as Ranke did, "to extinguish [his]
own self, as it were, to let the things speak and the mighty forces appear
which have arisen in the course of the centuries. 5
3
48 Ranke wrote that "[t]rue doctrine lies in the knowledge of the facts," and that "[s]trict
presentation of the facts, conditional and unattractive though they may be, is unquestionably the
supreme law, for historical research is oriented by its very nature to the particular." KRIEGER,
supra note 41, at 5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The historian, Ranke
insisted, "should be satisfied with simple information-satisfied that it merely corresponds to the
object," and be confident that history would emerge from it, because in his view, events
themselves were inherently linked through causal nexuses. Ranke, supra note 45, at 40. Ranke
also believed that history could not be practiced where such evidence was unavailable. "We are
fortunate where documentary traces remain. At least these can be grasped. But what happens
where there are none, for instance in prehistory? I am in favor of excluding this period form
history because it contradicts the historical principle which is documentary research." Id. at 45.
49 Leopold von Ranke, Preface to Universal History, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 161.
50 KRIEGER, supra note 41, at 4.
51 Leopold von Ranke, Preface to The First Edition of Histories of the Latin and Germanic
Nations (Wilma A. Iggers trans.), in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY, supra note 42, at
137.
52 "We judge the past too often by the present situation.... We, who search for truth, even in
error, who view every existence as permeated with original life, must above all avoid this error."
Ranke, supra note 45, at 41-42.
53 KRIEGER, supra note 41, at 5 (quoting Ranke, citing Hans Herzfeld, Vorwort, in RANKE,
UBER DIE EPOCHEN DER NEUEREN GESCHICHTE (Hans Herzfeld ed., 1917)). Ranke did not think
this standard could be perfectly attained, but thought that it should be attempted. Objectivity, for
Ranke, was the task that "'the historian.., must set for himself all the more since personal
limitation hinders him from attaining it."' Id. (quoting Letter from Leopold von Ranke to King
Maximillian II of Bavaria (Nov. 26, 1859), in DAs BRIEFWERK 432 (Walter P. Fuchs ed., 1949)
[hereinafter BRIEFWERK]). Ranke continued, "[t]he ideal of historical education would consist in
training the subject to make himself wholly into the organ of the object, that is, of science
(Wissenschafi) itself, without being hindered from knowing and presenting the complete truth by
the natural or fortuitous limits of human existence." Id. (quoting the same letter)
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A. Benjamin's Critique of Historicism
Benjamin offers two salient criticisms of historicism: First, he
contends that its model of history is philosophically indefensible.
Second, he contends that historicists, despite their claim to tell the past
as "as it really was," in fact tell histories that serve the "victors" of
history, because they equate history with tradition and heritage, and
thus, with authority.
Benjamin considers the objectivist pretenses of the historicists to
be folly: "[t]o articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize
it 'the way it really was.' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory
as it flashes up at a moment of danger. '54 From the discussion in Part I,
it should be clear why Benjamin rejects the historicist view: he
understands history as an image that is constructed, not discovered. 55
Thus, Benjamin writes that true history is "based on a constructive
principle," rather than the "additive" principle that he associates with
historicism. 56 For Benjamin, "the 'purity' of the gaze is not so much
difficult but impossible to attain. '57 Note, though, that when he says
that true history is constructed, Benjamin does not mean that it is
"fabricated" or radically contingent. The fact that one can draw many
meanings out of the past does not mean that one can draw any meaning
out of the past. And as we will see in Part IV, it also does not mean that
every mode of constructing the past is, for Benjamin, as good as any
other.58
For Benjamin, historicism does not just produce flawed or willful
history. It also endangers the past, or more accurately, all of those
moments of the past that do not count as heritage and tradition.59 He
writes:
From what are phenomena rescued? Not just or not so much from
the ill-repute and contempt into which they've fallen, but from the
catastrophe when a certain form of transmission often presents them
54 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
255. He notes elsewhere, "[t]he history that showed things 'as they really were' was the strongest
narcotic of the century." Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 51.
55 Ranke, in contrast, considered himself a kind of "Columbus" or "a kind of Cook for so
many beautiful, unknown islands of world history." KRIEGER, supra note 41, at 11 (quoting
Letter from Leopold von Ranke to Heinrich Ritter (Oct. 28, 1827), in BRIEFWERK, supra note 53,
at 123, 126; Letter from Leopold von Ranke to Karl Vamhagen von Ense (Dec. 9, 1827), in
BRIEFWERK, supra note 53, at 123, 126).
56 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
262.
57 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 59.
58 The value of a particular image of history, for Benjamin, is its "actuality," not its
definitiveness or authoritativeness. I undertake a full explication of this in Part IV, infra.
59 "In every era," Benjamin writes, "the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away
from a conformism that is about to overpower it." Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of
History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at 255.
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in terms of their "value as heritage."--They are rescued by
exhibiting the discontinuity that exists within them. There is a kind
of transmission (Uberlieferung) that is catastrophe.60
(berlieferung can mean both transmission and tradition: catastrophe is
here both a transmission and a tradition; it is the transmission of the past
as a tradition.
Why? Because traditions ossify the past and experience, taking
away from our ability to act to change the present order. To look to the
past solely for its "value as heritage," 61 Benjamin claims, is to
empathize with those who dominate today. 62 Thus, Benjamin asks
rhetorically, with whom do the adherents of historicism actually
empathize? He concludes:
The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all rulers are the heirs
of those who conquered before them. Hence, empathy with the
victor invariably benefits the rulers. Historical materialists know
what that means. Whoever has emerged victorious participates to
this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step
over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice,
the spoils are carried along in the procession. They are called
cultural treasures, and a historical materialist views them with
cautious detachment. For without exception the cultural treasures he
surveys have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror.
They owe their existence not only to the effort of the great minds and
talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toils of
their contemporaries. There is no document of civilization which is
not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a
document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner
in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. 63
For Benjamin, historicism empathizes, wittingly or unwittingly,
with those who have dominated in the past, constructing a heritage that
inevitably justifies the status quo. This claim is both descriptive and
theoretical. At the descriptive level, Benjamin references the actual
political leanings of the German historicists, who were famously both
nationalistic and committed to demonstrating the superiority of their
current states.64 Ranke himself insisted that history itself could not
60 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 63.
61 Id. at 67.
62 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
256. Empathy, although not a term we necessarily associate with history today, was an important
term for historicists. Ranke, for example, "pleaded for empathy and understanding via direct
inspection of the sources, and... occasionally argued that ideally the historian ought to
extinguish his own self in order to let the events speak for themselves." Wolfgang J. Mommsen,
Ranke and the Neo-Rankean School in Imperial Germany: State-oriented Historiography as a
Stabilizing Force, in RANKE AND SHAPING HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 46, at 124, 137.
63 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
256.
64 Ranke himself wrote that "one does not study history only for school: the knowledge of the
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"approve of the overthrow of the old, as if it were something completely
dead and unusable .... This demolishing and changing and again
demolishing is not the way of nature .... History, of course, recognizes
the principle of movement but as evolution, not revolution. '65
Importantly, however, Benjamin did not understand the politics of
historicists to be accidental or unrelated to their methodology. Instead,
he thought their methodology both emerged from and strengthened their
commitment to the status quo. Insofar as historicists ignored realms
other than official state politics, ranked sources into a hierarchy with
official documents at the top, and aspired to tell a history of "major
events" and "heritage," Benjamin believed that they would inevitably
do nothing more than carry the spoils of history on behalf of those who
have emerged victorious.66 By accepting a link between history and
tradition, Benjamin insisted, historicists in fact served authorities in the
past and those who have continued to win. 67
history of mankind ought to be the common property of mankind and, above all, should benefit
the nation to which we belong and without which our studies would not even exist." Leopold von
Ranke, The Role of the Particular and the General in the Study of Universal History, in THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY, supra note 42, at 57, 58-59; see also James M. Powell,
Introduction, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY, supra note 42, at xii, xvii ("Although
[Ranke] identified objectivity with 'impartiality' (Unparteilichkeit), his focus on documents of
state, which he viewed as primary sources for historical studies, involved an implicit conservative
bias in favor of the existing political and social order."). As discussed above, the German
historicist school that Ranke inaugurated justified the German Empire as the "noblest work of
political evolution." Walter Prescott Webb, The Historical Seminar: Its Outer Shell and Its Inner
Spirit, 42 MISS. VALLEY HIS. REV. 3, 7 (1955).
65 Ranke, supra note 45, at 43. Of particular importance for Benjamin was likely the Neo-
Rankean school of German historians who had gained prominence in Germany in the
Willhelmine era, and who continued to be influential in the years in which Benjamin wrote. See
Mommsen, supra note 62, at 125. Neo-Rankeans formed part of the intellectual flank of the
conservative backlash against democratization in Germany, see id. at 128, and they turned to
Ranke because his theories allowed them to project the "semi-authoritarian structure of the
Bismarckian state ... as ... the product of objective historical forces, not just as the result of a
revolution from above . I. " d. at 129. Despite their claims to objectivity, the Neo-Rankeans
"quite deliberately sought to create a new national identity for the German nation which was in
line with given conditions in Imperial Germany." Id. at 130. Mommsen credits them as having
some influence on the demise of the Republic. See id. (noting that even after the transition to
democracy in 1918 these historians' "publications, which still reached a wide public, contributed
to undermine the slim chances of survival for the Weimar Republic").
66 Ranke, for example, considered the "most precious jewel" of mankind's heritage to be:
those immortal works of genius in poetry and literature, in science and
art, which.., represent what is common to all mankind. With this
possession are inseparably combined the memories of the events, the
institutions, and the great men of the past. One generation hands on this
tradition to another, which may again and again be revived and recalled
to the minds of men, as I have the courage and confidence to do.
Leopold von Ranke, Preface to Universal History, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF HISTORY, supra note 42, at 164.
67 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 56. Benjamin wrote:
Barbarism inheres in the very concept of culture: taken as the concept of a hoard of
values that is independent, not of the production process from which those values
emerged, but of the process in which they survive. In this way, they serve the
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As Arendt puts it, Benjamin understood that "[i]nsofar as the past
has been transmitted as tradition it has authority; insofar as authority
presents itself historically, it becomes tradition. '68  It was the
historicists' emphasis on heritage and tradition, and the necessary link
between these concepts and that of authority-that is, the way that
authority and tradition reinforce one another-that Benjamin wanted to
make visible and challenge. His question, simply put, was, why do
historicists think that those things that are visible as "heritage" have the
most value? 69
As Jack Balkin has noted, "the continuation of any tradition must
necessarily kill off other possible lines of development, and relegate
them to the margins or brand them as heretical. '70 Benjamin knew this,
and was persuaded that "tradition puts the past in order, not just
chronologically but first of all systematically in that it separates the
positive from the negative, the orthodox from the heretical, and [that]
which is obligatory and relevant from the mass of irrelevant or merely
interesting opinions and data. '71 Those who claim to look at the past
"uncontaminated" by the present end up looking only at major events,
taking an uncritical view of cultural heritage and traditions. They see
only the genius in works that appear immortal, not the unacknowledged
labor that also helped create them. Benjamin thus insists that "[t]here is
no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of
barbarism." For Benjamin, barbarism is identified with both the
''anonymous toil" that contributed to such documents of civilization,
and also with the mode of history that perpetuates this anonymity.
Historicism, which produces history as "tradition" and a series of
"cultural treasures, '72 pronounces great swaths of the past to be without
meaning for the present; to the historicist they are simply "trash." 73 All
apotheosis of the latter, no matter how barbaric it may be.
Id.
68 Arendt, supra note 8, at 38.
69 The desire to equate tradition with virtue has the same tautological structure of the well
known joke that asks why it is that one always finds things in the last place that one looks for
them. If a historical practice or document does not survive it is not available to be called a
tradition. There can, of course, be counter-hegemonic claims to tradition, and Benjamin spoke of
wresting traditions away from conformism. See Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of
History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at 255. Here, however, he refers to hegemonic
constructions of tradition.
70 Balkin, supra note 5, at 1715 (citation omitted).
71 Arendt, supra note 8, at 44. Arendt juxtaposes the figure of the devotee of tradition with
that of the dedicated collector (which Benjamin was): "Against tradition the collector pits the
criterion of genuineness ...- Id.; see also Sontag, supra note 19, at 17.
72 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
256.
73 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 47 (noting that the method of his
Arcades project was to "[o]nly exhibit ... the trivia, the trash-which I don't want to inventory,
but simply allow to come into its own in the only way possible: by putting it to use").
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traditions are therefore necessarily the spoils of those who have won in
the past and who continue to win today; they are narratives that connect
the victors of the past and present. But Benjamin wants very much to
dissociate this kind of winning, which he sees as simple domination,
from true victory, in which those who win deserve to win. (I will
discuss this further in Part III.) Historicism's focus on great events and
cultural heritage robs the past of its ability to affect the present, and
perpetuates the domination of those who have inherited the victories of
the past, of those who have always had the power to define and transmit
heritage and cultural value.
B. Constitutional Historicism
What can all of this tell us about constitutional history? There is a
distinct kind of constitutional claim that we can usefully refer to as
historicist, in the Benjaminian sense of the term.74 Like Benjamin's
historicists, constitutional historicists are preoccupied with returning to
the past. They see historical inquiry as an objective and scientific
process, and because of their need for certainty, they focus, like Ranke,
solely on authoritative documents and major events. They insist that
when properly conducted, history transmits tradition or consent, and
thereby authority. But unlike Benjamin's historicists, constitutional
historicists are required to justify this claim in legal terms, and reconcile
it with the text's contemporary legitimacy. They do so with reference to
notions of contractarianism and majoritarian tradition.75 Constitutional
historicism posits that history can provide definitive and final
constitutional meanings in the present, and thereby bind us to the mast
of past commitments, and lend both authority and restraint to
constitutionalism, and the particular practice of judicial review.
74 As will shortly become clear, the definition of constitutional historicism developed here
differs fundamentally from the definition of historicism in the work of other scholars. See, e.g.,
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law
Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 174 (2001) (describing "legal
historicism" as the view that "the conventions that determine what is a good or bad legal
argument are not fixed, but change over time in response to changing social, political, and
historical conditions"); Gordon, supra note 1, at 1028 (describing and advocating a mode of
"critical historicism" that "reveals traces of... pasts continuing pervasively into the present");
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017 n.1 (1981)
(referring to historicism as "the perspective that the meanings of words and actions are to some
degree dependent on the particular social and historical conditions in which they occur, and to
interpretations and criticism that are suggested by that perspective").
75 See Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 21
(1990) (discussing the view that "the Constitution [is] binding in the same way that a promise is
binding, as a single voluntary act of willful self-regulation").
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It is clear that historicism, thus defined, plays a prominent role in
constitutional thinking today. It is present in all arguments that claim to
produce definitive constitutional interpretations by objectively summing
up past facts, which are treated as synonymous with the intent of the
Framers, the meaning of the constitutional text at the time that it was
drafted, or the majoritarian and officially sanctioned traditions of the
American people.
Raoul Berger, for example, argues almost exclusively in the
historicist vein. A self-styled "originalist," he insists that objective
historical inquiry can determine even the most complicated questions of
constitutional interpretation, such as the true meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 76 Berger argues that we can draw such judgments solely
from legislative history, i.e., authoritative texts.77 Originalists claim that
this methodology is the single best form of constitutional interpretation
because it serves democracy. According to Berger, for example,
originalism is "not a scholastic exercise rooted in abstraction; it serve[s]
as a brake on judicial revision of legislative enactments. '78 This view
relies fundamentally on the conceit of consent. Another originalist,
former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, put it this way: "A
Jurisprudence of Original Intention... reflects a deeply rooted
commitment to the idea of democracy .... The Constitution is the
fundamental will of the people; that is why it is the fundamental law."79
The historicist Constitution is presented as a legitimate constraint upon
contemporary subjects because "the People" agreed to it in the past, and
we are they.80 Precisely how we are they is, as a rule, unspecified.
76 See Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 632
(1997) (rejecting Rakove's view of the intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Raoul Berger, Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 528
(rejecting Eric Foner's argument about the meaning of the same Amendment) [hereinafter Berger,
Reflections].
77 Berger, Reflections, supra note 76, at 533 (drawing upon legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment to conclude that "'Equal Protection' merely restated in positive terms the
Civil Rights Act's negative that 'there shall be no discrimination' with respect to the enumerated
categories"). For a competing claim on this point, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985) (arguing that the original
intentionalism did not mean the same the same thing to earlier proponents of the practice as it
does to contemporary proponents such as Berger).
78 Berger, Reflections, supra note 76, at 526.
79 Speech of Attorney General Edwin Meese III to the American Bar Association,
Washington D.C. (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 9 (Federalist Soc'y ed., 1986). Similar claims can be found in the writings of
other constitutional historicists. So, for example, Robert Bork insists that "[t]he original
Constitution was devoted primarily to mechanisms of democratic choice," and objects that
"[c]onstitutional scholarship today is dominated by the creation of arguments that will encourage
judges to thwart democratic choice." ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1984).
80 So, for example, Michael McConnell writes that "[c]onstitutional text was formally
adopted by a supermajority of the people, and deserves respect for that reason." Michael W.
McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 682.
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Current majorities and judges are bound by past supermajorities because
sometime in the past, "the people" consented to something precise,
something specific, something knowable. We might call this
contractarian historicism.
Textualism, as that term is, usually employed, is another
contractarian mode of historicism. Justice Antonin Scalia, a professed
textualist, contends that history is objectively determinable and provides
the best strategy to assign fixed meaning to constitutional texts. He
concedes that although "it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the
original understanding of an ancient text," we can do it if we "somehow
plac[e] out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did
not, and put[] on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties
that are not those of our day."'81 And although we might not have cause
to be confident that lawyers will get the "correct historical answer,"
Scalia insists, that is not because the historical act is indeterminate.
Rather, "for the vast majority of questions the [historical] answer is
clear. ' 82 Despite his suspicion that judges have neither the time nor the
training to engage in rigorous historical inquiry, Justice Scalia defends
the interpretive mode of originalism as a limitation upon judicial
overreaching: "the main danger in judicial interpretation of the
Constitution.. . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections
for the law .... Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness
of the system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually
quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself. 83
Two less common forms of historicism also bear mentioning. One
is traditionalism, which seeks constitutional guidance from tradition.
Tradition here is defined as the historical "status quo," or what "our
society" has believed over time.84 Some traditionalists argue in the
contractualist mode, looking to tradition to find evidence of the intent of
the Framers. 85 Others are similarly intentionalist, but more general in
the will that they seek to uncover. They perceive in tradition a past and
often tacit "common consent" that ought to bind us today.86 Other
traditionalists insist that adherence to tradition is an obligation we have
81 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989). At
times, Scalia notes that he would not apply historicist arguments, and perhaps no judge would
employ this methodology universally. See id. at 861 (noting that in some cases originalism "is
medicine that seems too strong to follow," and that he himself would not use it in a case about the
constitutionality of branding or public lashing).
82 Id. at 863.
83 Id. at 863-64.
84 For a thorough and illuminating discussion of the traditionalist mode of constitutional
argument, see Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993). Brown defines
tradition as "what a society believes (or professes to believe) with respect to its values and
aspirations for itself." Id. at 182.
85 For a discussion of cases and theorists that argue in this vein, see id. at 183-91.
86 Id. at 191.
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to prior generations. 87 All of these modes of traditionalism share the
qualities of historicism as described above: they look to the past for
clear rules and customs that we can bind ourselves to in the present, and
ascribe to the past its own sui generis authority.
The most modest form of historicism concedes that many historical
questions about our Constitution cannot be definitively answered, but
insists that some can, and that where they can, the answers ought to be
granted present day authority. William Nelson offers an excellent
account of this sort of argument, which he calls "descriptivist." The
fundamental assumption of descriptivism, according to Nelson, is that
"good history can accurately portray past reality." 88 The historical act
is, for the descriptivist, an act of summation. And we can be
descriptivists even if we concede that most historical questions cannot
be decisively answered.89 We simply give authority to such arguments
wherever context is not a problem.90
So influential is historicism in our constitutional order that even
the staunchest critics of historicism often make claims that sound in the
historicist register. Cass Sunstein, for example, calls his mode of
interpretation "soft originalism," because it takes the past as central to
constitutional interpretation, but insists on viewing it at a high level of
generality.91 As will become evident in Part III, this kind of argument is
better described as progressive-a mode of history driven by a narrative
of progress and a willingness to discard aspects of the past that are
inconvenient. The "softness" is motivated by a different vision of how
we ought to relate to our constitutional past.92
87 Id. at 212-13.
88 See Nelson, supra note 1, at 1246.
89 Nelson argues that this will be the case because most of the time, we will have to choose a
context in which to explore a historical question, which will shape the answer we give to it. Id. at
1252.
90 Id. at 1292 (concluding that judges-even those who recognize that in many hard cases,
history gives us no answers-should consider themselves "compelled by American political
theory's doctrines of positivism and neutrality to be an interpretivist in those cases where only
one context is available for examining the meaning of a constitutional text").
91 Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 ITARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 313
(1996). Sunstein identifies this kind of originalism with Ronald Dworkin and Justice Brennan.
Id.
92 Similarly, there are many historians who insist that history can lead us to reasonably
definitive accounts of the meaning of the past, but are just as sure that these meanings ought not
be accorded legal authority today. Because they sunder the link historicism draws between the
past and authority, they also do not properly belong in the historicist category. Many historians
of our constitutional past adopt this mode, at least some of the time, because historians are
generally interested in "a dead past; a past unlike the present [whose] differentia of the historical
past lies in its very disparity from what is contemporary," and this interest leads them to
"emphasize all the ways in which [the] meaning [of past practices] depends upon the material
conditions, symbolic systems and tacit assumptions in which they were embedded." Robert W.
Gordon, On the Critical Use of History: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1023, 1025 (1997). Perhaps the most influential example of this kind of argument is H. Jefferson
Powell's attempt to out-originalist the originalists, by showing that "original intentionalism was
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C. Benjamin's Critiques
These modes of constitutional argument suffer from the same two
errors identified in the above discussion of Benjamin's critique of
historicism. First, historicism attributes a false certainty to its history,
and by doing so, fails to take responsibility for its own acts of
interpretation. Second, in order to defend its conflation of the past and
authority, historicism reduces history to heritage. It thus serves the
victors of the past, and undermines historicism's claim to the
contemporary legitimacy that it seeks.
1. Fallacy One: History is Certain, and by Itself Authoritative
Historicist arguments about the Constitution conflate the domain of
fact with the domain of history. They do this because they want to
borrow certainty for history from the domain of facts; they insist that
because facts can be known finally and beyond dispute, history can also
be known in the same way. In other words, they confuse the necessary
relationship that facts have to history with a determinative relationship
that facts do not have. 93
For Benjamin, "no fact that is a cause is for that very reason
historical." 94 As discussed above, Benjamin does not contest the notion
that there are facts in the past, or that past events can be the cause of
other events past or present. Benjamin's argument that no historical
image can be definitive does not, therefore, rely upon the view that
there are no facts. Benjamin is devoted to facticity, and ascribes fully to
in fact a form of structural interpretation," and that "[t]o the extent that constitutional interpreters
considered historical evidence to have any interpretive value, what they deemed relevant was
evidence of the proceedings of the state ratifying conventions, not of the intent of the framers."
Powell, supra note 77, at 888. Another example of this mode can be found in Jack Rakove's
book Original Meanings. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996).
93 As shorthand, we can think of the difference between factual inquiry and historical inquiry
this way: if a surveillance camera could provide the answer to the question, the question is not a
historical one. It is instead a question of fact-perhaps an important one (much of what the
judicial process does, after all, is determine facts), but not a historical one.
94 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
263. The German word for fact that Benjamin uses is Tatbestand (rather than Tatsache or Fakt).
Walter Benjamin, Ober den Begriff der Geschichte, in I GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN, supra note
33, at 704. Tatbestand has a legal connotation, and can also mean evidence, or the "facts of a
case." His choice of Tatbestand over Tatsache can be read to suggest that such facts always are
discerned and take on meaning through an act of judgment, not of passive perception. Ranke, in
contrast, contended that "[e]vents which are simultaneous touch and affect each other; what
precedes determines what follows; there is an inner connection of cause and effect. Although this
causal nexus is not designated by dates, it exists nevertheless. It exists, and because it exists we
must try to recognize it." Ranke, supra note 45, at 40.
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the importance of facts to historical construction. 95 What he rejects is
the notion that a fact carries an inherent meaning which reveals itself in
history or that dictates the contours of the historical image. 96 Past facts
themselves do not arbitrate among the histories that may correspond to
them. They only take on meaning when we exert ourselves in relation
to them, when we interpret them.97
Returning to the figure of the constellation, we cannot derive
definitive constellations by addressing ourselves to the inherent
"meaning" of stars. Stars have many qualities that can be described
factually-age, distance from the earth, distance from one another,
brightness-but while these factual qualities may relate to
constellations, they do not determine them. And the position of a star in
the night sky, while "true" in some sense, and something that can be
mapped, is at the same time a product of our own perspective. This
does not mean that we are incorrect to relate to the stars in this way, for
what matters to us, when making constellations, is what we make of the
stars as they appear to us. Benjamin believes the same holds true for
past facts. They have many aspects or forms that do not correspond to
the order of historical interpretation. Although they exist, and can
sometimes be ascertained -in the same way that some stars can be seen
and mapped in the night sky-they have a mysterious autonomy, one
that ought to be respected. But they also have a stability, an object-
ivity-the property of objects-that permits us to relate the past to the
present in ways that make sense to us.98 This, finally, is what Benjamin
means when he says that the past is an "index."
95 Benjamin was a collector, and also asserted the centrality of the fact to his own writings.
He wrote that his Arcades project was an attempt to grasp the origin of the Paris arcades "through
economic facts." But the facts of facts do not tell us very much, in Benjamin's view.
These facts, seen from the point of view of causality, that is, construed as
causes, do not however constitute originary phenomena; they become this
only insofar as in their own development (Entwicklung)-unfolding
(Auswicklung) might be a better word-they allow the whole series of the
arcade's concrete historical forms to emerge, like a leaf unfolding forth
from itself the entire wealth of the empirical plant kingdom.
Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 50.
96 Arendt, supra note 8, at 48 ("What mattered to [Benjamin] above all was to avoid anything
that might be reminiscent of empathy, as though a given subject of investigation had a message in
readiness which easily communicated itself, or could be communicated, to the reader or
spectator ... ").
97 Thus Benjamin wrote: "That which is original is never revealed in the naked and manifest
existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. It ... is related to its history
and subsequent development." Walter Benjamin, Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian, in ONE
WAY STREET, supra note 19, at 352. That is, facts take on their meaning through insight, and
thus their meaning is always under development. It is always a product of "dual" insight, insight
that is dialectical, that combines the present and the past.
98 As Sontag writes, "Benjamin remained faithful to things-as things." Sontag, supra note
19, at 17. To Benjamin, "[o]nly because the past is dead is one able to read it. Only because
history is fetishized in physical objects can one understand it." Id. at 21.
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We can chronicle the past, but when we seek to know something
about it, we can only do so by making images, which requires
interpretation. Every history must leave facts out, must pick one among
an infinite number of historical questions to answer, and must make a
leap between facts and historical meaning, involving an interpretive act
not amenable to full or final resolution. Bernard Williams makes a
similar point when he insists that "there can be agreement on [historical]
facts and disagreement about what makes sense of them to whom.
Given some period or sequence of events, very different narratives will
make sense of it to different parties, and this may involve not just a
difference but a conflict. . . ."99 And that matters because, for
Benjamin, knowledge of the facts is not properly called knowledge at
all-instead, "all human knowledge takes the form of interpretation." 00
A few examples will help elucidate the point. It is a fact that
President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in 1865. Under
Benjamin's terms, however, that fact in and of itself is not historical. In
order to become historical, that fact must be placed in relation to other
facts, and interpreted from the place of the present day. A historian is
not interested in the fact of Lincoln's assassination alone. He is
interested, instead, in what that fact means in conjunction with other
facts, such as Andrew Johnson's decision to issue mass pardons and
oppose the platform of the Radical Republicans. His historical
questions-for example, whether it was inevitable that the ideal of equal
citizenship for blacks would rapidly be sacrificed during
Reconstruction-have no single and demonstrably "true" answer. They
are claims, and attempts to persuade, and Benjamin tells us that they
will always be related, however distantly, to a concern of the present
that defines the historian's interest in the history he seeks to
construct. 101
Finding the facts involves investigation, and the facts can be more
or less certain, depending on the quality of the evidence and the quality
99 BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 240 (2002). Williams' analysis here is
very similar to that offered by Benjamin. Like Benjamin, Williams distinguishes between facts,
which can be true or false, and historical narratives that are drawn from such facts. Although
Williams wants very much to hold onto the notion that history can be "true" (for him, truth
operates like Benjamin's facticity), he also insists, like Benjamin, that such truth does not get us
very far: "There is no such thing as 'the truth' about the historical past, though.., there are many
truths about it." Id. at 257. Williams also shares with Benjamin a sense of the importance of our
own exercise of agency in the present: "Making sense of [the past] on a larger scale," Williams
writes, "will be a matter of interpretation, and interpretation is up to us. The past will not make
sense unless we make sense of it." Id. at 244; see also Part IV, infra.
100 Sontag, supra note 19, at 18 (quoting a Letter from Walter Benjamin to Christian Florens
Rang (Dec. 9, 1923)).
101 To offer a few examples, the historian might be interested in understanding race relations
in America today, or why it is that the Democratic Party has such a difficult time winning
southern states in a national presidential election, or whether a different kind of Reconstruction,
one that might have left us with less social stratification today, might have been possible.
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of the sleuthing. But constructing history is a different act altogether,
one that it is possible to get wrong-by invalidating the facts, or
ignoring them-but that it is not possible to get definitively right. There
are many different ways to put facts together to make meaning out of
them in relation to one another. Returning to the metaphor of the
constellation, it is possible, in the same stars, to see both the Little
Dipper and Ursa Minor. One is not more correct or definitive than the
other as far as the stars are concerned. A history, like a constellation,
can only be "true" in one very limited sense, in the same way that it can
be false: it can get its facts (or stars) right (or wrong). But many
histories will meet this criterion for "truth." Historical events, as
Norman Spaulding recently put it, "are, to say the least, not merely
complex, but overdetermined." 0 2  In order to sort between such
histories, we need a criterion that is external to the facts themselves. As
we will discuss in Part IV, this measure is, for Benjamin, always a
measure of the insight and impetus that the historical image provides to
the present.
Facts themselves do not carry historical meaning. If you sum them
up, you get a chronology, not a history. If they are to have meaning,
that meaning must be given to them, in relation to other facts and, for
Benjamin, in relation also to the present. There are several different
ways to understand the necessary uncertainty of the historical act. For
one, all historical accounts choose to relate only some of the possibly
relevant facts. Deciding which facts are relevant necessarily requires an
act of decision. 10 3  Constitutional canons 04 are one way to try to
102 Spaulding, supra note 7, at 2031-32.
103 For example, imagine that we can agree that the appropriate question of historical meaning
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is: "Given what we know of the views of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, does the Constitution permit the racial segregation of
public schools?" (We can imagine other ways of framing the historical question, of course, and
this presents yet another problem for those who purport to write objective history. But note that
we can concede to historicists both the fact of facts and the ability to agree upon a common
question, and still demonstrate that their histories are neither definitive nor self-authorizing.) Can
there be a definitive historical answer to that question? Benjamin would say no, because every
attempt to put facts together to create meaning relies upon acts of selection and interpretation.
Two different historicists will answer this question differently, because they will focus on
different historical facts. Raoul Berger, for example, looks to two facts about the framers: (1)
they generally supported segregation, and (2) they did not view the Amendment's language as
open-ended. He therefore concludes that Brown was wrongly decided. See RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 99-133 (1977). Robert Bork chooses different facts, insisting: (1)
that many Framers believed that separate was equal; but (2) that by 1954 it was clear that it was
no such thing. He therefore comes out in favor of the Court's holding in Brown. See Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971). Each of
these "facts" is complex enough that they themselves are the product of interpretative acts. They
cannot be posited before answering a series of interpretive questions, such as: Who are the
Framers (for example, do they include those who opposed the Constitution or an Amendment)?
What does equality mean? Should what the Framers thought about their words be determinative?
Many "facts" that matter in these kinds of arguments will have the same property-they will
themselves be the product of interpretations, and thus will necessarily fail to take the judge
10672005]
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sidestep this problem. But entries in a canon can and do change in ways
that respond to political developments in the present. 10 5 Additionally,
new facts are always being born into the constitutional sky, and drawing
upon these can always retrospectively change the meaning of past facts,
like a plot twist in a movie that changes the way we see all of the events
that came before it.106 Any truly historical interpretation, therefore,
requires judgment and agency.
outside of the domain of interpretation. The point here is not whether either Berger or Bork got
their facts right. The point is that both could get the facts right and still come up with different
interpretations of these facts, which is to say, different historical interpretations.
104 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary: The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 989 (1998).
105 For example, at one time in the not too distant past, Charles A. Beard's An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States was one of the most important historical
accounts of the Constitution for theorists of constitutional law. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). Today,
Beard's text is much less important to constitutional scholars than Gordon Wood's The Creation
of the American Republic. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969). The popular shift from Beard to Wood is less a result of objective evaluations
of the "truth" of each historical account than it is of the republican revival in constitutional
theory. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 96 (1997). Similarly, Jack Rakove's account of the
Founding may be popular today, but Benjamin would insist that this is not because it is right, but
because it provides the present with a way of meaningfully connecting itself to the past. The
interest that we take in a historical question will, according to Benjamin, predetermine what we
make of the past, because the needs of the present tell us what to look for and when to stop
looking.
Consider another example. The past two decades have seen an upsurge in interest in Anti-
Federalist thought. Although the Federalist Papers were published as a book as early as 1788,
there was no comprehensive collection of Anti-Federalist thought until 1981. See THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Paul Finkelman, The Complete Anti-
Federalist Edited by Herbert J. Storing, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 182-83 (1984). But new
constitutional concerns and political movements have found in the anti-Federalists a useful
pedigree, and thus constructed new theories about the relevance and authority of Anti-Federalist
writings. For example, some argued that the Anti-Federalists understood, and might therefore be
able to teach us about, the flaws of our contemporary Constitution, such as the Imperial
Presidency, and the risks of a secretive national government. Finkelman, supra, at 195-96 (noting
the "eerie modernity" of Anti-Federalist concerns). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
Anti-Federalists were "discovered" as a new and newly authoritative source in the 1980s, in the
wake of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers, and Watergate. A recently published citation
analysis of Supreme Court decisions concludes that the current Supreme Court majority in
federalism cases (which we might better call anti-federalism cases) is much more likely than the
dissenting group to reflect the views of Anti-Federalists. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of
Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV.
217, 223 (2004) (noting that the majority tends to cite more often to Anti-Federalist framers, and,
where they cite Federalist framers, they tend to cite statements that tended to address and placate
Anti-Federalist concerns). From his results, Smith concludes that "judges seeking the original
understanding are largely unconstrained in their ability to mold the historical record to serve
instrumentalist goals." Id. at 217; see also Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-
Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741 (2000). I thank Jack
Balkin for bringing this example to my attention.
106 Consider the example of Lincoln's assassination discussed above. If the historical question
being posed were, "What effect did the undermining of radical Reconstruction efforts have upon
racial hierarchy in the United States?," the answer to this could well differ depending on the
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The preceding analysis sharply undermines the usual defense of
historicism, which is that one answer to a historical question "will
almost always appear better than the other.'10 7 If this is true, it is not
the past-the facts that we can know about the beliefs of the Framers, or
the traditions of the majority-that will make it so. It will be
determined, instead, by some act of interpretation that occurs within,
and is inevitably influenced by, the present. Turning the historicist
metaphor of "blot[ting] out everything they know about the later course
of history"' 0 8 on its head, Benjamin insists instead that "[t]he events
surrounding the historian and in which he takes part will underlie his
presentation like a text written in invisible ink."'1 9  The political
concerns of today send the historian in search of the past-and the
nature of that interest structures what he will find there."10 In this,
Benjamin shares the view of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who once
wrote, "'[h]istory has to be rewritten because history is the selection of
those threads of causes or antecedents that we are interested in-and the
interest changes.""" There is no history without a subject constructing
it; there is no interest that is not formed in dialogue with the time to
which our own lives have assigned us.
Good history, according to Benjamin, is responsive to, and takes
responsibility for, that fact.12 Insofar as historicists deny this, and lay
claim to definitive or final historical accounts, they err. The most
ambitious historicist arguments, which seek definitive historical
answers to deep questions of constitutional meaning, err because when
they pose a question of meaning, they pose a question that cannot be
answered definitively. More modest historicist arguments seek to avoid
this problem by addressing themselves to questions of fact rather than
questions of meaning. Questions of fact might have conclusive
answers, but they are not historical questions. 1 3 What of the common
degree of racial subordination that exists today. Our view of even these distant events could well
change, for example, if we were to reach a point where schools were de facto integrated and
income and opportunity were not stratified by race.
107 Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 244 (1988).
108 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
256.
109 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 67.
110 See id. at 60 (noting that that there is no "homogenous history" of economics or literature
or jurisprudence, because "the various epochs of the past are touched in varying degrees by the
present of the historian ... [making] a continuity of historical presentation ... unattainable").
''1 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 812 n.103 (1989)
(quoting Holmes).
112 This point will become clearer after the discussion about Benjamin's conception of the
Jetztzeit in Part IV, infra.
113 For example, Nelson asks rhetorically whether anyone can doubt the historical intention
behind the Constitutional Amendment that provides that those having attained the age of eighteen
can vote. Nelson, supra note 1, at 1258. The answer might, in most circumstances, be no; or
20051 1069
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  1069 2004-2005
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
historicist claim that even if it is not possible to entirely blot out the
present, it is possible to get "close enough" to make their histories at
least mostly objective? Benjamin would insist that this is another
category mistake. Objectivity pertains to the domain of facts, not
history. Although facts have their own objective reality, it is not
possible to "objectively" tell a history. Those who claim to be telling
mostly-objective history, then, misunderstand the role that the present
and the subjectivity of the historian always plays in the staging of
historical questions, the construction of certain historical constellations,
and the interpretation that provides the impetus to the image drawn.
That does not make the historian "biased," nor does it make the history
that she writes unresponsive to fact. As will become clear in Part IV,
however, Benjamin would insist that those who purport to be objective
in the strong, interpretive sense of the word, misapprehend the nature of
the true historical project, which does not blot out the concerns of the
present, but instead occupies and actualizes them.
This, then, is the first problem with historicism: the certainty to
which historicist arguments lay claim is an illusion. There is also a
second problem. This illusion, like a Trojan horse, allows historicists to
smuggle acts of interpretation into the law without admitting to it.
Historicist constitutional arguments typically claim present-day
authority for the history that they tell, and seek to attribute this authority
to the past itself. But, to paraphrase Benjamin, nothing that is past is for
that reason authoritative. Every attempt to attribute authority to the past
requires an interpretive act.
Constitutional historicism insists that history, as a mode of inquiry,
can provide judges with interpretive limits. It claims, somewhat
paradoxically, to be a non-interpretive mode of constitutional
interpretation." 14 It thus presents the histories it tells as having a certain
authority stemming from the certainty of the history, suggesting that
more accurately, that no circumstance has yet arisen in which that intent is not plain. (In fact, the
present is always producing new problems of constitutional meaning, even where such meaning
might seem, at first glance, to be plain. Consider the recent discussions over whether former
President Bill Clinton could run as a Vice Presidential candidate. See, e.g., Jack Schafer, Vice
President Bill Clinton? Take 3, SLATE, Sept. 7, 2000, available at http://slate.msn.com/
id/1006013.) But all that this tells us is that Nelson has posed a question of fact and not of
history. This is the historical analogue to the argument Robert Post makes about the inadequacy
of the "plain language" rule as the favored rule of textual interpretation: "if for any reason (a]
meaning has become questionable, it is no help at all to instruct a judge to follow the 'plain
meaning' of the constitutional text. A meaning that has ceased to be plain cannot be made so by
sheer force of will." Post, supra note 75, at 14.
114 It is not clear, of course, why, if there is no interpretation to do, judges are required at all.
This is another version of the plain meaning fallacy that Post identifies. See supra note 113. If
historical analysis requires no interpretive skill, then how can judges argue over the historical
meaning of the Constitution? A historicist might contend that some judges are simply better,
more accurate historians than others, but this argument fails if Benjamin's understanding of
history is correct.
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the constellation it pictures possesses and fulfills its own criterion of
legitimacy. If it instead required an act of interpretation to bestow this
history with authority, then historicist arguments would not escape the
one domain that the historicist constitutionalist seeks to escape: that of
judicial interpretation. But even if history could produce definitive
meaning, it would still not have authority in the present until we
theorized why it ought to. This is particularly evident when we are
talking about the Constitution. A relation must be constructed between
the Constitution and its history in order to grant the past authority over
the present. But uncertainty necessarily seeps into the historicist project
at this point, because that relation is always constructed through an
interpretation. Acts of constitutional interpretation must provide an
account of their legitimacy. For historical interpretations, this account
will include a claim that their sources are relevant. But it is one thing to
claim that particular sources are relevant or authoritative; yet another to
insist that this claim is not itself an interpretive one. Although the
former argument is necessary, the latter is neither necessary nor
persuasive.
Richard Kay recounts that when Justice Black was once asked to
justify some unpopular constitutional decisions made by his Supreme
Court, he replied, "'the Court didn't do it.... The Constitution did
it.",,115 As Kay points out, "[a]ccording to this view, when a court finds
unconstitutional the otherwise lawful action of some agency of
government, it merely acts as the executor of a conclusive determination
already embedded in the Constitution."' 16 This is the historicist move
par excellence: it is not the judge, but the Constitution and its history
that make the decision. But once we sever the link between history and
authority, and admit that the attribution of authority to a text or image or
narrative is always itself an interpretive act, historicists are back down
the rabbit hole of judicial interpretation. The only thing that historicism
accomplishes with this move, therefore, is a disavowal of its own
interpretive agency.
2. Fallacy Two: History is the Same Thing as Heritage
The second fallacy to which historicist claims about the
Constitution fall prey is that they confuse history with what Benjamin
called "heritage." This confusion is related to the first fallacy: in order
to narrow the historical field to one that has more hope of generating
certainty and authority, historicism focuses only on documents that
115 Kay, supra note 107, at 226.
116 Id.
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appear to be bounded and authoritative. Recall Hannah Arendt's
articulation: "Insofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition, it
possesses authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, it
becomes tradition." 11' Benjamin saw the conflation of
tradition/transmission with history and thus authority as catastrophic,
because it domesticates the past and serves those he called the victors of
history. Constitutional historicism has its own version of this problem,
and as we will see, it undermines its claim to legitimacy in the present.
It is time to address a question that some may be troubled by: Does
the task of the constitutional lawyer or theorist thinking about the past
really compare to the task of the historian? If not, can Benjamin's
criticism of the methodology of historicism properly be applied to the
methodology of constitutional historicism? The argument may go
something like this: Lawyers do "law office history."'1 8 They turn to
the past in the service of constitutional interpretation. Modes of
discerning constitutional history are always also modes of constitutional
interpretation. They are attempts not only to say what the past "really
was," but also to attribute legal authority to the past. Historians do not
have to do this.'1 9 So while Benjamin's conception of history may be
worthy as far as it is applied to historians like Ranke, why should it
have relevance to the decisions that lawyers must make when they
attempt to construct constitutional history?
Benjamin is relevant to constitutional theory because constitutional
thinkers are subject to their own versions of all of the missteps that
Benjamin's historicists did. As the last two sub-sections have shown,
constitutional historicists wish to claim authority and certainty for
constitutional history, just as historicists such as Ranke wished to claim
authority and certainty for the histories that they wrote. But as I have
demonstrated, the past cannot bear the burden that either version of
historicism seeks to place upon it. Constitutional historicists are under
a different obligation than historians to offer interpretations of how their
histories relate to constitutional authority, but they seek to solve their
authority problem in the same way that Benjamin's historicists did: they
focus only on aspects of the past that appear to have their own authority,
what Benjamin called "heritage."
Historicist arguments, relying on the contractarian theory described
above, most commonly posit that contemporary authority comes from
our agreement to something in the past. We may ascertain what we
117 Arendt, supra note 8, at 38.
118 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 387, 389
(2003).
119 A historian can develop an account of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment without
also offering an account of how and whether that meaning ought to have constitutional authority.
No one would be surprised, therefore, to find many more lawyers than historians making
historicist arguments, which conflate history with authority.
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agreed to by looking at the evidence surrounding the passage of
particular constitutional provisions, which historicism presumes comes
in three basic forms: (1) evidence of the views of the federal body that
drafted the constitutional text; (2) evidence of the views of the state
bodies that ratified the text; and (3) evidence of the views of "the
People" more generally. 120 If we are to take the democratic justification
of historicism seriously, it would appear that the most authoritative
understandings or intentions-indeed, the only truly authoritative
understandings or intentions-would be those of the People themselves,
who are the ultimate source of the text's legitimacy.
Unfortunately for historicists, there are no sources that fully
correspond to or reveal the intentions of the People. Nevertheless, if
prior consent is to constrain interpretation, it must be both discernable,
and sharply bounded in meaning. Historicists thus seek proxies for the
People's intent, turning to bodies of evidence that can be more readily
ascertained, that are codified, and that offer a limited number of views
to be aggregated. 121  As a result, historicism ironically relies upon
sources in inverse proportion to the value that the democratic
justification for historicism suggests these sources ought to have.
Thus, historicist arguments rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the
views of the Framers, and often express, but rarely defend, the
assumption that the views of the Framers matter most to constitutional
120 See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1180 n.4 (1987) (noting that those
who seek objective evidence of the intended meaning of constitutional texts look to an
"interpretive universe" that "may include the members of the Philadelphia Convention, the
members of the state ratification conventions, or the 'We the People of the United States' referred
to in the preamble"). The category of "the People" is sometimes reduced to that of the
"electorate," but that itself raises another interesting problem: Should "the People" be understood
to be only the legal electorate at a given point, or the subjects of the Constitution more broadly-
including those who would become part of the electorate, but were not at the time? I am not
aware of any historicist that precisely addresses this issue, but it poses a question about how
democratic the mode of historicism really can be, and how we evaluate this.
121 Ronald Dworkin offers the most comprehensive critique of this position in a discussion of
statutory interpretation. He points out that there are innumerable mental states that might matter
to one who presumed that a law obtained its justification from democratic assent, including the
views of members of Congress who did not speak, the views of citizens who wrote letters to their
representatives or otherwise made their views known to representatives, the lobbyists who
pressed for one or another change, and even the views of those who could later have amended the
law but did not. See RONALD DWORK/N, LAW's EMPIRE 318-19 (1986). And although Dworkin
is talking about statutes, the problem only gets worse with constitutions, which may have
additional participants, such as state ratifiers. Dworkin rightly concludes that "judgments about
whose thoughts count will be sensitive to [the interpreter's] views on the old question whether
representative legislators should be guided by their own opinions and convictions, answerable
only to their own conscience, and on the newer question whether lobbying, logrolling, and
political action committees are a corruption of the democratic process or valuable devices for
making that process more efficient and effective." Id. at 319-20. Dworkin goes on to contend
that even if we could pick an authoritative group, we would still have the problem of divergent
views within that group-providing yet another aporia of interpretation to which historicism fails
to adequately respond. Id. at 320-21.
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meaning. 122 In order to more authoritatively excavate the views of the
framers of different portions of constitutional text, historicists turn to
the written documents that they assert most authoritatively reflect these
intentions, such as Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention 123
and the Federalist Papers, despite the fact that such sources themselves
possess only a weak claim to accurately express the views of the
Framers, much less the People. 124 Many constitutional scholars have
suggested that the state ratification debates are a better proxy for the
will of the People than are the secret discussions of the Philadelphia
Convention, 125 but historicists exhibit little interest in these debates. 26
Even textualists and objectivists who claim to seek only the
contemporary meaning of the constitutional text often find themselves
working primarily, if not solely, from nearly the same narrow range of
sources that intentionalists use. 127
122 So, for example, Raoul Berger looks to the view of Congress, rather than state ratifiers,
when he seeks to establish the fixed meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). He also insists that the views of the Framers of
the original constitutional text are the most authoritative sources. See RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS DESIGN 13-20 (1987). And Robert Bork asserts that "[i]t is
necessary to establish the proposition that the framers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the
sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis may proceed." BORK, supra note 70,
at 10. As Robert Post has written, "[b]y far the most common form of historical interpretation...
regards the intentions of the Framers as the best evidence of the agreement represented by the
Constitution." Post, supra note 75, at 21.
123 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (H. Gilpin ed., 1842).
124 See Post, supra note 75, at 22 (noting that "The Federalist Papers are by common
convention now presumed to constitute authoritative (and convenient) evidence of the intent of
the Framers, although any historian could easily demonstrate the empirical inadequacy of the
presumption"); see also James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24-35 (1986) (discussing the debates over the reliability
of Madison's notes, and stressing, in particular, that Madison only appears to have taken down a
small portion of the discussions that took place each day). As noted above, of course, Benjamin's
critique does not turn on the claim that the documents that historicists use must be "inaccurate" or
"untrue." Rather, it is the selection of these documents, and the suppression of others, and the
necessary act of interpretation that occurs when we engage with them-in other words, the
valence of the process of the historicist historian, rather than particular veracity of his materials-
that Benjamin calls attention to.
125 See, e.g., Post, supra note 75, at 22; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 214 (1980).
126 This may be because there is only one source that directly reports on the state ratification
proceedings themselves. See Hutson, supra note 124, at 13; see also id. at 21 (noting that the
compiler of these state ratification convention notes confessed that they were "inaccurately taken
down").
127 Textualists such as Justice Scalia, who seek to interpret the Constitution by considering
what its words meant at the time that they were enacted, argue that a slightly broader set of
sources is appropriate to the historicist inquiry. But because they are after the same thing as the
intentionalists, and similarly believe that they must find it in authoritative texts, they end up using
much the same sources. For example, Justice Scalia insists that he is not at all interested in
divining the intent of the Founders, but nonetheless relies upon texts like the Federalist Papers,
because the writings of Framers like Madison and Hamilton "display how the text of the
Constitution was originally understood." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
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The readiness with which historicists turn to certain sources over
others has more to do with their ability to defend the resulting history as
authoritative than it does with the place each particular source
theoretically ought to have in our constitutional order, according to the
democratic claims of constitutional historicism.128 The desire to speak
authoritatively leads historicists to privilege certain texts over others,
limiting what they can see in the constitutional text. Constitutional
historicists thus make the same mistake that Benjamin's historicists did:
they attach themselves to certain documents because these documents
have survived and carry with them the illusion of sui generis authority.
But the subset of authorities that historicist constitutional arguments
rely upon no more represents the full and proper domain of the history
they seek to tell than does the subset of authorities that Benjamin's
historicists relied upon.
A bias is built into historicism's approach to history-one that is
not accidental but rather immanent to this approach to history.
Historicists weld together two claims to fashion history as an
authoritative interpretative weapon: First, the relevant past is found only
in a select set of texts, authored by a much smaller group than that
which historicism claims to draw authority from. Second, we today
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). I am therefore inclined to agree
with Robert Clinton when he insists that, in practice, there is little difference between
"subjective" and "objective" versions of originalist arguments. See Clinton, supra note 120, at
1181 n.4. It is less clear whether this same criticism about the limitation of historical sources
would apply to traditionalist or modest historicist arguments; this likely would depend on which
version of tradition or past truth is being invoked.
128 There are many ways to try to structure one's sources in order to be able to claim authority
for the resulting interpretation. One is to name a particular set of texts-which one has access
to-to be authoritative, and then claim to be able to interpret them objectively. Another way is to
apply mathematical and statistical methods to the past, treated here as data, to attempt to force the
past to reveal its truths. Constitutional historicists tend towards the former, given the dominant
narratives of legal legitimacy in the present. The latter strategy was adopted by the
Cliometricians, who focused particularly on the issue of slavery. See 1 ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL
& STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO
SLAVERY 7 (1974). Cliometrics is also a kind of historicism; it insists that its "central aim [is] the
discovery of what really happened." Id. at 8. Like Ranke, Cliometricians did not always insist
that they could find the right answer because sometimes data did not exist or was not reliable-
but they insisted that their mode lead to true understanding where appropriate data was available.
Id. at 9. Also like historicists, their desire to be free from bias leads them "to base [their]
statements on evidence drawn from as high up in this hierarchy of reliability as possible," and
devalue "fragmentary evidence" based upon "unverifiable impressions of individuals" subject to
ideological biases, but have greater confidence in fragmentary evidence from "objective" sources,
or any systematic data. Id. at 10-11. Interestingly, literary studies has recently been subject to a
cliometric attack, led by Stanford Professor Franco Moretti, whose mode of interpretation
involves charting and counting, rather than reading. See Emily Eakin, Studying Literature by the
Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at B9 (noting that Moretti tries to explode the canonicity of
the literary discipline by writing a "history of literature as data points"). Such scholarship is very
Benjaminian in its fierce attachment to facts, and its desire to reconfigure what counts as an
authoritative source. But the resonance with Benjamin ends at the moment these methods claim
to be producing a single authoritative or definitive interpretation of the past's data.
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must turn our own authority of interpretation over to these same texts,
because the identity of We the People present is conflated with the
identity of We the People past.
The first claim introduces one kind of bias. As we have seen
above, limiting the historian or judge to only "authoritative"
constitutional texts does not, in fact, produce definitive answers to real
questions of interpretation. There are a lot of stars, even in the strictly
authoritative constitutional sky, and new ones are always being born.' 29
But because they want to produce authoritative history, historicists must
restrict themselves to a limited universe of texts, a canon that can
change, but which can never exceed the domain of the authoritatively
transmitted. But only certain kinds of history are codified in written
texts. So the historicist canon can be opened to allow in, for example,
Anti-Federalists, 13 but it is much harder to see how it could be
expanded to include the largely uncodified views of plebian white men
or slaves at the time of ratification. 131 This is one of the catastrophes
that the search for authority that emanates from the past produces. 132
The second claim introduces another kind of bias, which is
probably more dangerous than the first. It is easiest to see in the
contractarian mode of historicism, and in the context of those
amendments that dramatically changed the political identity of "the
People" by eliminating status-based barriers to formal citizenship.
According to current historicist methodology, it is always the political
subjects who preceded an amendment that give meaning to its
injunction. That is because historicists adopt a proceduralist fetish,
treating the intent of those who framed a document as authoritative,
even if the amendment itself undoes the notion that those who framed it,
did, in fact, have a legitimate claim to authority.
If history and the Constitution are soldered together at the point of
"original intent," we must, for example, read the Thirteenth Amendment
from the point of view of the legislators who wrote its words, and
ignore the meanings that might have been attributed to the Amendment
by those who were purportedly liberated by its injunction. We are also
obliged to read the words of the Nineteenth Amendment according to
the imagined intent of the men who passed it, rather than the women
129 This is evidenced by the tendency of both the majority and the dissenters in
(anti)federalism cases to rely upon the views of the Framers in making their arguments. See infra
note 105 and the accompanying discussion.
130 See supra note 105.
131 Historicists adopt the view that Ranke insisted upon, that is-that everything that is
undocumented should be avoided by the true historian. See supra note 48.
132 As discussed above, things that appear as authoritative on their own, Benjamin would
insist, only achieve that appearance by drawing upon the authority of the victors. The appearance
of authority is a sign that you have won, according to Benjamin. And only things that have been
part of the possibly authoritative in the past-that would have been codified-can become part of
an authoritative canon.
1076 [Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  1076 2004-2005
THE REDEMPTIVE CONSTITUTION
who demanded it-the women who only after its passage had the right
to be included in the domain of constitutional intention.
There is something undeniably awkward about the insistence that
the Amendment that gave women the right to vote is defined by an
intent that was constituted through women's exclusion. Even if we
adopt the marginally more expansive inquiry advocated by textualist
modes of historicism and expand our sources to, say, the "intellectual
atmosphere of the time,"'133 we still invest the amendment most closely
associated with women's emancipation with meanings developed under
conditions of their exclusion.
The exclusion problem is different from and much more troubling
than the so-called "dead hand problem" elucidated by those who object
to originalism.134 To object to dead hands is generally to say that we
would rather not be born into laws that are not of our own making,
especially when they were made in years past. In that sense, all law
(including statutes and the common law) has a dead hand problem, and
the constitutional problem is just of a special magnitude because of the
differential difficulty of exerting our collective will to change the
constitutional text. But as Benjamin emphasizes, we are always already
bound to the past, because it is the material we use to understand the
time in which we live. And in a democracy we are, or course,
inevitably bound by wills that are not our own, and always by laws that
came before us.
The crucial political objection to historicism cannot be based upon
a notion that we would rather not be born into history or language, but
would prefer to make it all up ourselves. Everyone is born into a
language and political system not of their making. The crucial question
is, who inhabits the power to remake political meanings, and how? If
we all shared that power equally, and always had, then the only problem
with the authority claimed by historicists would be the problem of the
bias of their sources. And though I could complain that I did not choose
this Constitution in the same way that I did not choose to speak English
as a first language, it is hard to see how this is a relevant political
objection.
The objection that Benjamin brings into view is not about being
governed by an abstract will that is not entirely one's own. It carries
with it not just a concern about will but about distribution, not just
133 Scalia, supra note 81, at 856.
134 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional
Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1613 (1997). Eisgruber puts it this way:
Adherents of the Dead Hand Fallacy believe that our obligation to honor specific
constitutional provisions-such as those creating an independent president or life
tenure for judges of the right to a jury trial in common law civil cases-is in service of
a more general obligation to yield to the will of past super-majorities.
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liberty but equality. It focuses our attention on the particular subjects
that have been authorized to make constitutional meaning since the
text's inception. Catherine MacKinnon poses the issue succinctly: "No
woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the
social order under which women, as well as men, live."'135 The issue is
not really that no woman helped draft the Constitution. After all, none
of today's men did either, and to frame it as a matter of immediate self-
representation is simply to subsume this point under the rubric of the
dead hand. Rather, the important point here is that the subject "woman"
was excluded from constitutional subjectivity and participation at the
time of the Framing. Women's subordination was presupposed in the
formation of United States, and this originary exclusion shaped the
political discourse that emerged as constitutional.
A recent case illustrates the point. In United States v. Morrison,'36
the Supreme Court struck down that portion of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) that provided a federal civil remedy for victims
of gender-motivated violence. 137 The Court first concluded that
Congress lacked the power to enact the provision under the Commerce
Clause. It reasoned that gender-based violence did not "substantially
affect commerce" because "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.' 138 Although the
pivot of the argument was the 1995 United States v. Lopez decision, 39
the basic principle that the Court insisted upon-"[t]he Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local"' 40-was located in much older cases such as Marbury v.
Madison14 1 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States. 42
The Morrison Court also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment as a
basis for Congressional power, citing the "time-honored principle that
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action." 143 That rule had been laid down in two 1883 cases, United
States v. Harris,144 and the Civil Rights Cases,145 and the Court insisted
135 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1281 (1991).
136 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
137 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
138 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
139 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
140 Id. at 617-18.
141 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The majority opinion cited Marbury for this proposition:
"Departing from their parliamentary past, the Framers adopted a written Constitution that further
divided authority at the federal level so that the Constitution's provisions would not be defined
solely by the political branches nor the scope of legislative power limited only by public opinion
and the legislature's self-restraint." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
142 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
143 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
144 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
145 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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that stare decisis was particularly compelling in this instance, because
the rule had been "on the books" for such a long time, and because
every Member of the Supreme Court at the time "had been appointed by
Presidents Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur, and each of their
judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity
with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 146
Despite their differences, the majority's arguments are in one
crucial way the same: they both derive their authority from sources and
majorities that were forged long before women were enfranchised.
Where were women as political subjects when the definition of
commerce and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment were decided?
Where were they when the balance of state and federal power was
struck, and it was decided that the federal government could not directly
regulate the family? The official answer is, nowhere. 147  Is it
implausible that if the definition of the "truly national" had been forged
through a process that required women's political participation in
national governance, it might have taken on a very different cast? Or
that, had women participated as full political subjects in the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment, they might have demanded that the federal
government be authorized to regulate "private" conduct such as that at
stake in Morrison? The very fact of VAWA's passage could, of course,
be taken as evidence in favor of this hypothesis. As could the vast field
of scholarship that has emerged over the past several decades theorizing
the gendered nature of the Constitution's conception of the public.148
Before traveling too far down this road it must be admitted that the
counterfactual is absurd; and that is precisely the point. It is impossible
to conceptualize the shape of the Commerce Clause as if the subjectivity
of women helped define it because it did not. But this much ought to be
clear: Historicists tell a version of constitutional history that
predominantly incorporates women through a relation of exclusion.
Through the authority of the histories that they tell, and then would
write into law, women continue to be those who did not decide whether
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to regulate
146 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622.
147 Note, for example, that the sole reference to women appearing in the Federalist Papers
refers to the "danger[] that the private intrigues of courtesans and mistresses pose to the safety of
the state." LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 105 (1980). We might argue, of course, about whether statements
like these represent a form of exclusion or a very selective kind of "inclusion." (Ought we
conclude that women were left out of the Federalist Papers, or suggest that they were included as
a threat to the state, as sexually troublesome subjects?) For my purposes here, what matters is
that women were not included as political subjects, as citizens in the full sense of the term.
148 See, e.g., CATHARINE A MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-
34 (1989); MacKinnon, supra note 135, at 1281; CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT
(1988).
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private action, or whether the Commerce Clause permits Congress to
pass laws granting federal jurisdiction over gender-motivated violent
crimes. And they remain without the power to change this unless they
mobilize under the banner of a new Amendment, a burden under which
subjects who have always already been included do not labor.
The exclusion problem is of course not limited to women.
African-Americans were not enfranchised in time to play a role in
establishing the "intended meaning" of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, or to play their rightful role in the "intellectual
atmosphere" of the time. Indeed, one is led to wonder why, if
historicists are so possessed by the need for "consent," they do not insist
that the entire constitutional document should be renegotiated after any
status-based barrier is lifted. How can it be that historicism derives its
legitimacy from the claim that it protects democracy? Why is it former
slaveholders, rather than former slaves, who get to define the word
"slavery" in the Thirteenth Amendment?
Some would say that this exclusion has no bearing upon the current
legitimacy of the Constitution. As long as the rules were followed, as
long as the texts that we inherit were passed in procedurally legitimate
fashion, these rules can legitimately constrain present day political
decisions. 49 But there is an irresolvable tension-an aporia-between
the democratic legitimacy that historicists want to claim and the
procedural legitimacy that they must rely upon to justify their method of
interpretation. Most Americans think that if they are bound by
constitutional law it is because it is their law. Historicists trade on this
sensibility, mobilizing a narrative identification with the people today,
to claim legitimacy in the present for their methodology of fidelity to
the past. The problem lies in who counts as "we." Either the past was
procedurally legitimate, but they were not us, or they were us, but not
all of us were rulers, making the past procedurally illegitimate.
Historicism thus trades on two inconsistent views: It insists that
We the People and We the Rulers are the same group, and always have
been. But that is clearly not the case. The Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments prove that, at least from the perspective of the present
day.150  In the historicist paradigm, either the Constitution is
149 There is, of course, a very good argument that many of our most hallowed constitutional
texts-from the Reconstruction Amendments to the original text-were enacted in procedurally
improper fashion. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 1.
150 Those groups that still have not successfully mobilized for inclusion into our procedural
democracy--children, legal permanent residents, and so forth, cannot make the same complaint.
Under current constitutional rules, or the theories of democracy that currently hold broadest sway,
or the legitimation narrative of historicism, there is no democratic problem with excluding
children from voting but applying laws to them nonetheless. Under all three of these schemas,
there is, however, a profound problem today with presuming that women's interests ever were
adequately represented by their husbands, or slaves by their masters. The Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments would appear to have decided that, because their passage required a
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procedurally legitimate or it is democratically legitimate. Historicist
theory wants to have it both ways, but it breaks down: the historicist
claim to an authoritative past and the historicist claim to serve
democracy in the present cannot be reconciled. If we split apart
narrative identification from procedural legitimacy by challenging the
existence of an ahistorical "We," it becomes apparent that historicists
must in fact choose between their affiliation to the past and their
affiliation to democratic legitimacy in the present. They choose the
past.
Historicists arguments also serve the past where their anchor is
majoritarian tradition rather than contractualist consent. The horizon of
tradition that historicists look to may long predate the entry into
citizenship of many of those considered necessary constitutional
subjects today. The notion of "common consent" expressed by
toleration of past laws or practices is already strained; it becomes
unrecognizable to the discourse of contract if it is suggested that
political consent can be expressed by those who are formally excluded
from both the political process and the sphere of public discourse.
Similarly, authority that is granted to the status quo ante simply out of a
sense of duty to the dead is difficult to reconcile with the view that our
legal order, and particularly our Constitution, has changed in ways that
could not be undone without seriously affecting its legitimacy or
viability today. No traditionalist would publicly defend a Constitution
that tolerated the exclusion of women from the electorate. And yet the
mode of history that traditionalist historicist arguments practice has the
same effect: it attributes authority to legal traditions that emerged under
conditions of exclusion that are intolerable today.
When elaborated according to the dictates of historicism, our
Constitution embodies a paradox: the legal conditions of equality and
democracy are drawn from a constitutional history and discourse that
did not intend this very democracy, this very equality-indeed, that
barred it. Historicist arguments fail when they claim a legitimacy that
stems from the present and an authority that stems from the past.
Benjamin understood this, and therefore sought to properly claim
authority for history by rooting it firmly in the present, while making it
responsive to the past. I will elaborate upon this in Part IV, when I
discuss his theory of redemptive history. But before I turn to
Benjamin's redemptive alternative, I will address the second relation to
history that Benjamin criticized, a relation that he called progressivism.
repudiation of any such logic. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex, Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002)
(discussing the theories of familial representation that were repudiated through the Nineteenth
Amendment).
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III. AGAINST PROGRESS
A. The Concept and Critique of Progress
Benjamin's historical project went "hand in hand with an
immanent critique of the concept of progress." 151 Benjamin understood
progress as a worldview with deep roots in the Enlightenment. 152 His
primary example of progressive thought came, however, not from
philosophy, but from the German Social Democratic Party (SPD),
whom Benjamin accused of having a "conception of progress which did
not adhere to reality but which made dogmatic claims."' 153 At the time
of Hitler's rise to power, the SPD was the largest political party in
Germany, but its response to the Nazi threat was remarkably tepid, even
conciliatory. 154  Benjamin-along with many historians 55-attributes
this to the SPD's conviction that they would eventually and inevitably
prevail, that all they had to do was keep strictly to a legal framework
and their party and ideas would attract growing support. The SPD's
belief in progress, he asserted, conditioned their view that fascism was
just a phase, and that they were the ones truly "moving with the current"
of history. 56 The belief in progress engendered their "conformism,"
and their "servile integration into an uncontrollable apparatus," in which
Benjamin saw disaster.1 57
"Progress as pictured in the minds of Social Democrats," Benjamin
writes, "was, first of all, the progress of mankind itself (and not just
advances in men's ability and knowledge). Secondly, it was something
boundless, in keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind.
Thirdly, progress was regarded as irresistible, something that
151 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 67.
152 See Rabinbach, supra note 10, at xii.
153 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
260.
154 See W.L. GUTTSMAN, THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1875-1933 322-23
(1981). For example, the SPD did not resist when, in 1932, the SPD-led Prussian government
was illegally removed from power. Id. at 322.
155 See id. at 322. Among the evidence Guttsman cites is a pamphlet published on the day that
Hitler came to power by a member of the SPD Party Executive entitled "Be Ready That's What
Matters." Id. at 327 n.80. Another historian notes that "[i]t was argued, not only in the SPD, that
it might be the best tactic to let [Nazism] come to power and run itself into the grave. Variants of
this argument were heard up to 30 January 1933," when Hitler came to power. E.J.
FEUCHTWANGER, FROM WEIMAR TO HITLER 235 (1993).
156 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
258.
157 Id. Whether Benjamin was right about the SPD and the response that they should have
mounted against Hitler is, of course, a matter of historical interpretation (or construction, as
Benjamin would have said). For our purposes, that is less important than interpreting the figure
that the SPD plays in Benjamin's critique, to help elucidate his concept of progress.
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automatically pursued a straight or spiral course. . . ."158 These
predicates are central to how Benjamin characterizes the progressive
sensibility, and why he rejects it.
First, Benjamin identifies progressivism with the conviction that
mankind "itself' can improve. This is a criticism of a mathematical
logic that measures success against an average, "'dismiss[ing] the
claims of individual eras or individual men and ... ignor[ing] all their
misfortune, provided that mankind as a whole has made progress.' '1 59
Indeed, how is it possible to assert that mankind "as a whole" makes
progress when some members do not? The concept of mankind here
gives a patina to a claim that is, at heart, about the advance of some
rather than all. Benjamin rejects this view, asserting that "'there can be
no progress which does not add to the happiness and perfection of those
individuals who previously suffered an imperfect lot."160
The second claim that Benjamin associates with progressivism is
the notion that the horizon of progress is infinite, that mankind is
infinitely perfectible. He writes,
[i]t was inevitable that the concept of progress should run up against
the critical theory of history the moment that progress was no longer
presented as a measure of specific historical changes, but rather as a
measure of the span separating a legendary beginning from a
legendary end of history. In other words: as soon as it becomes the
signature for the course of history in its totality, the concept of
progress is associated with an uncritical hypostatization rather than
with a critical placing into question. 161
As is evident from the discussion of Benjamin's theory of history
above, he rejects the notion that history can be viewed or summed up as
whole. Progressives thus err when they impose upon the infinitely rich
past and unknowable future a vision of totality. The kingdom of God,
Benjamin insists, "is not [the] aim but [the] end" of history.162
The last tenet of progressivism is that mankind not only can
become perfect, but that it will, as a matter of course. Progressives
believe that history is on their side, and that their views will inevitably
158 Id. at 260.
159 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 71 (quoting the philosopher Rudolph
Hermann Lotze).
160 Id. (quoting Lotze). Benjamin also notes that Lotze, who he calls a critic of the concept of
progress, "counters the opinion that 'enough progress has taken place when.., in the general
context of an ongoing level of ignorance, the education of a small minority strives ever higher'
with the question: 'How can one speak of a history of mankind given these assumptions?' Id. at
73.
161 Id. at 70. As I note in Part IV.A infra, Benjamin did not reject the notion that things could
improve in the future. For him, there is a kind of progress that we can strive for, but it is not one
that is guaranteed, or ever fully achieved. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
162 De Man, supra note 27, at 45 (quoting and translating from Walter Benjamin, Theological
and Political Fragment, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 38, at 312, 314).
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triumph. No fact from the past or present has the power to disrupt or
derail the narrative that they tell. 163 They can retrofit any past or present
event in order to make it match their concept of history. 64 Benjamin
thinks that this tendency makes progressives complacent and
undermines their ability to both see and react to the dangers of the
present, because it privileges an attachment to the ideology of advance
over any evidence to the contrary. No one can prove a progressive
wrong when he insists that things will be better tomorrow, or if not
tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow, or maybe the day after that.
Because the belief in progress determines the trajectory of history in
advance, it robs us of the capacity to experience what is actually
happening in the present. Or, as Benjamin puts it, "[t]he current
amazement that the things we are experiencing are 'still' possible in the
twentieth century is not philosophical. This amazement is not the
beginning of knowledge-unless it is the knowledge that the view of
history which gives rise to it is untenable."'1 65
For Benjamin, an Enlightenment faith in progress, or texts, or
political practices that guarantee our eternal advance, is a dangerous,
pacifying delusion. Benjamin's view echoes that of Abraham Lincoln,
as expressed in his address to the audience at the Young Men's Lyceum
of Springfield:
But, it may be asked, why suppose danger to our political
institutions? Have we not preserved them for more than fifty years?
And why may we not for fifty times as long? We hope there is no
sufficient reason. We hope all dangers may be overcome; but to
conclude that no danger may ever arise, would itself be extremely
dangerous. There are now, and will hereafter be, many causes,
dangerous in their tendency, which have not existed
heretofore .... 166
163 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
261. "Real political experience," in contrast, Benjamin says, is "absolutely free" from the
appearance that things are always the same. Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at
63.
164 Ranke and Benjamin shared this concern, and both adopted a similar criticism of Idealist
approaches to history. Ranke sounds a great deal like Benjamin when he warns against Fichte's
philosophically driven view that: "[e]verything worthy of knowledge would seek only to know to
what extent the philosophic principle can be demonstrated in history: to what extent the progress
(Fortgang) of mankind, seen apriori, takes place." Ranke, supra note 45, at 36. Benjamin wants
to transcend the opposition between Idealism and Historicism, by positing a form of history that
neither idolizes the past "as it really was," or subsumes it to the ideology of progress.
165 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8,
at 257.
166 Address of Abraham Lincoln before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan.
27, 1838), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 108, 113 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
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Like Lincoln, Benjamin suggests that the potential dangers of treating
the future as foreordained will always outweigh the benefits. Vigilance
may have costs, but they are less than the costs of complacency.
Benjamin thus rejects the progressive view that we ought to
measure injustice on average rather than with particularity, that it is
possible to leave the past behind and to achieve heaven here on earth,
and that we should relinquish our powers of perception in favor of a
belief that the future will always be brighter. What these three concepts
have in common, he says, is their sense of "progression through a
homogenous, empty time."'1 67 Benjamin insists that "[a] critique of the
concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the
concept of progress itself."'1 68 Such a critique would lead us to the
realization that "[h]istory is the subject of a structure whose site is not a
homogenous, empty time, but time filled with the presence of the now
[Jetztzeit]."'1 69 I will discuss Benjamin's notion of Jetztzeit in Part IV,
infra. For the moment, it is sufficient to note his most fundamental
critique of progressivism is that it eviscerates our ability to perceive and
act upon the present.
The belief in progress, Benjamin insists, requires us to relinquish
our ability to connect to a past that could motivate and orient change in
the present. This is figured vividly in Benjamin's image of the angel of
history:
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like
to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.
But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This
storm is what we call progress. 170
The belief in progress propels the angel into the future, preventing him
from attempting to undo the catastrophe that historical forces have not
ceased to produce. Disaster ensues because causal forces from the past
continue to operate today, throwing wreckage at the angel's feet.
Benjamin did believe in historical causes, forces that persist
through time and have political effects. 171 As Holmes once quipped,




170 Id. at 257-58.
171 Benjamin discusses such forces in the "Theses," for example, when he describes the trend
towards greater technologization and exploitation of nature that he understood to be linked to the
"technocratic features" of fascism. Id. at 259. Benjamin criticized the Social Democrats for
being blind to the dangers of this dynamic. Id. at 258 (noting that the Social Democrats
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"historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity."' 72
Benjamin would have agreed, for he believed that we can act to rescue
the present from catastrophic wrongs. The past can be an important tool
in this fight, and Benjamin believed that we must seize hold of it when
it flashes up, offering us a chance to perceive and to act. 173 In his
account, there are several reasons the past can be useful to those seeking
to act in the present. First, wrongs are conditioned by historical forces,
and we must understand these forces in order to act against them.
Second, addressing ourselves to the facticity of the past (when
conceived of as all of that which has come before, rather than as the
spoils of tradition) can help us disrupt narratives of heritage and
progress that blind us to possibilities past and present. Third, it is in the
past that we find the affect that drives us to act in the present. As Frank
Michelman once asked: "'Without the past,... who am I?... Who are
we?... Without a sense of our identity, how do we begin to make a
case for anything? Without mining the past, where do we go for
inspiration?'" 74
Progress narratives give up too much when they profess to leave
the past behind; what they leave behind is a part of the present. And
that which they give up may well be something that we have yet to
experience or understand, but that lives on, continues to have effects,
and colors our vision of both the possible and the just. For Benjamin, to
discard elements of the past is to discard possible ways of understanding
the present, and an essential component of our ability to change it.
C. Constitutional Progressives
The belief in progress of which Benjamin spoke is endemic to
constitutional thought today. Although it is distinct from the
progressivism of the SPD, it nonetheless partakes of the sensibility of
which Benjamin spoke. Progressivism makes itself felt in all arguments
that project constitutional history as a rising rather than fixed star.
Progressives place their bets on the future. They offer a picture of our
constitutional past as a march of progress, from status to contract, from
exclusion to inclusion, from We the Propertied White Men, to We the
mistakenly thought that "factory work that which was supposed to tend towards technological
progress constituted a political achievement"). The Social Democrats, he insisted, "recogniz[ed]
only the progress in the mastery of nature, not the retrogression of society." Id. at 259.
172 Speech of Oliver W. Holmes, Learning and Science, at a dinner of the Harvard Law School
Association in honor of Professor C.C. Langdell (June 25, 1895), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
138, 139 (1920).
173 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
263.
174 Quoted in Kalman, supra note 105, at 103.
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People that are also unpropertied, of color, women, and so on. It treats
this movement as unidirectional, running from less to more freedom,
and it considers the Constitution the vehicle of this advance.
Applied to the Constitution, Benjamin's concept of progress is a
marriage between what Robert Gordon calls progressive and
teleological forms of history. For Gordon, "a narrative of progress is
one in which the legal system is seen as obeying a long-term process of
historical transformation--e.g. from feudalism to liberal capitalism,
status to contract, subordination to equality," and "a teleological
narrative is one which shows legal forms working themselves pure over
time to reveal their core of immanent principle.' 75  Believers in
constitutional progress thus see past majorities and understandings as
less enlightened, less free, and less equal, than We the People in the
present. Like Benjamin's progressives, they adopt a "soft" approach to
the constitutional past, seeking to leave most of it behind. 176 For
progressives, our constitutional order is legitimate because it allows us
to govern ourselves in the present in a way that permits our collective
advance. The only use of history is to demonstrate that this is so.
Progressives must disavow any notion that we, or our legal structures,
might continue to feel the profound effects of injustices in the past. The
progressive approach to constitutional history asserts that, in all the
ways that really matter, the evils of our constitutional past have really
been overcome.
Lawrence Tribe presents this kind of argument when he suggests
that the real achievement of the Founders is
the legacy of a living Constitution-not only a Constitution capable
of change, but a Constitution containing the tools for its own future
development in the amendment provision of article V and in the
judicial power of article III. And it contains not only the tools for its
future development, but the seeds of its own future growth, in the
form of a vision-a still imperfect vision-of a "more perfect
Union" than the framers' own compromises had yet achieved. 177
For Tribe, "most of the Constitution's story ... is a story of struggle to
live by the Constitution's light-to extend its writ, making rights
available to groups that had once been excluded, and making
responsibilities attach to individuals who had once been exempted."'1 78
The notion that the Constitution was defective before the
175 Gordon, supra note 1, at 1023.
176 See the discussion of Sunstein's soft originalism at text accompanying supra note 91.
177 Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the Constitution or to Bury It?, 37 AM.
UNIv. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987).
178 Id. at 4. In taking this view, Tribe distances himself not only from the originalist insistence
that we must bind ourselves to a past moment of idealized consent, and also from constitutional
redemptivists like Justice Thurgood Marshall. See id at 2-3; see also infra Part IV (discussing
Marshall as a theorist of the redemptive Constitution).
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Reconstruction Amendments, according to Tribe, "forget[s] the
institutional structures" that made possible the passing of those
amendments, the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and
the dramatic expansion of civil rights protections that occurred from the
1950s to the 1970s.179
The same progressivism is also displayed in Cass Sunstein's
assertion that "much in our constitutional history is bad and no longer
useable."' 80 This view acknowledges that there are unsavory aspects of
the past, but learns from them that we must move beyond the past,
further along the spiral of constitutional progress. According to this
progressive mode, the forward momentum of the Constitution and its
felicity for change outweigh the evils previously done in its name,
because the trajectory of history is always on the rise. Rather than
dwell on the past, we ought to look for the best in our history, and
improve upon it.
So pervasive is the progressive spirit that it turns up in unexpected
places, such as Bruce Ackerman's theory of the dualist Constitution.
Although Ackerman's theory is, at a formal level, agnostic about the
virtue of the choices that the People make, the only moments of
constitutional change that he is willing to give the name "constitutional
moments"1 81 all fit the progressive narrative. Thus Ackerman's writings
on Reconstruction focus on the triumph of Republican ideals of racial
justice and national citizenship182-not, as McConnell has pointed out,
on the possibility that the landslide Republican defeat was a
constitutional moment itself, but an evil one, authorizing the
construction of a Jim Crow republic. 183 As Joyce Appleby has written,
Ackerman's "conception of [We the People's] intentions resembles an
ascending escalator, carrying the American public ever higher, even if
they get off for long spells to meander through cookware and sporting
equipment."'1 84 This is not to say that Ackerman is wrong about
179 Id. at 3.
180 Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 604 (1996).
181 For a definition and discussion of "constitutional moments," see, for example, Bruce
Ackerman, Fidelity as Synthesis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519 (1997). Ackerman defines a
constitutional moment as a moment that "occurs when a rising political movement succeeds in
placing a new problematic at the center of American political life." Id. at 1519.
182 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 72-79 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995).
183 Michael N. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMM. 115,
119-29 (1994). Ackerman rejects McConnell's claim that 1874 was a constitutional moment.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 471-74 & 474 n.126
(2000).
184 Joyce Appleby, The Americans' Higher-Law Thinking Behind Higher Lawmaking, 108
YALE L.J. 1995, 1995 (1999). Appleby goes on to say that Ackerman's "Whiggish overlay upon
the argument of Transformations appears most strikingly in the discussion of Reconstruction, in
which all acts are optimized-whether those of intransigent Radical Republicans or white
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whether 1874 was in fact a constitutional moment, or to say that he
might not conclude that the next constitutional moment is, regrettably, a
step backwards for We the People. Rather, it is to take note of the
cadence of progressivism that suffuses his history: Ackerman's
Constitution, and People, has only improved, at least so far. And
nothing in its past compromises its ability to improve still more in the
future.
D. The Problem with Constitutional Progressivism
Benjamin offers us several criticisms of the progressive attitude
towards constitutional history: Progressivism is glib about the
perfectibility and plasticity of the "People" and the Constitution. It
risks complacency by dismissing the possibility that the Constitution is
indelibly marked by the wrongs of the past, or that the future could hold
less liberty and less equality. In its need to defend the Constitution as a
vehicle of historical advance, it naturalizes the changes that have
happened as, for the most part, the right ones. Like Darwinism, which
defines those who have survived as the fittest, progressivism defines
those who have prevailed as the deserving. 85 To maintain this view,
constitutional progressivism employs the same statistical strategy that
Benjamin's progressivism did: it counts the People's progress on
average, but claims that the average represents us all. It also telescopes
out into the future whenever she comes across groups that it thinks
ought properly be liberated, and insists that they will be.
Thus, a progressive who ticks off the list of steady advances in
constitutional inclusiveness will likely make no mention of the poor,
who were arguably ambushed on their own constitutional march to
recognition. 86 A progress narrative need not write off the poor; it could
supremacist Southern Redeemers. Some higher force is orchestrating this partisan cacophony
into a melodious resolution." Id.
185 Benjamin himself made this connection: "The doctrine of natural selection... popularized
the notion that progress was automatic. Furthermore, it promoted the extension of the concept of
progress to the entire realm of human activity." Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note
20, at 68.
186 Consider the life of constitutional pronouncements such as those put forth in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (refusing to read the Social Security Act to prohibit states from
capping grants by family size, and implying that welfare assistance is not a fundamental right),
and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (holding that
"wealth discrimination alone" does not provide a basis for invoking strict scrutiny). Anyone with
a basic familiarity with constitutional law will tell you today that there is no constitutional right to
welfare, and the way that they say it will typically suggest that this is intrinsic to the meaning of
our Constitution, rather than a contingent interpretation that could change. One popular casebook
puts it this way: "Note that in the welfare context, the claimant is not asking the government to
leave him alone, but is asking it to give him something. The Constitution is ordinarily thought of
as creating limitations on government rather than as establishing affirmative rights." GEOFFREY
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just as easily conclude that there is yet time for the poor to be added to
the end of the march. That is undoubtedly the case, but that reply would
also suggest that there is nothing catastrophically wrong with a
Constitution that does not already include freedom from want, or from
discrimination on the basis of poverty, and that we also ought to expect
that if such a development were a good thing, that it will eventually
happen. That is, of course, the essence of the concept of progress.
As Balkin points out, most liberal constitutional theory engages in
a "sort of illicit intellectual bookkeeping: all of the beneficial features of
liberal democracies get attributed to their being liberal and democratic,
while all of their failures are assigned to their illiberal or antidemocratic
aspects."1 87 Indeed, one is tempted to argue that the notion of the march
of constitutional progress, although not verifiable, is necessary for
constitutional theorists, to fill a fundamental gap in the theory of
constitutional democracy. Unless we believe in progress, legal
authority appears remarkably fragile, even groundless. In order to see
the Constitution as a document that blends reason and will, 188 we
require a notion of progress. Otherwise what would guarantee that
reason is self-perfecting, that will is succumbing to its dictates? How
would we have faith in the wisdom of constitutional fidelity, if we could
not be sure that the Constitution leads us in the direction of more
democracy and more freedom?
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 921 (3d ed. 1996). As William Forbath put it in a
recent article, "[t]oday's Supreme Court tells us that the Constitution affords no protection against
desperate want, nor does it confer on Americans any other 'affirmative rights' to such basic goods
as minimally adequate education or a realistic opportunity to make a livelihood." William E.
Forbath, Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969-Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 597-98
(2004). According to Forbath, those who think that "social rights and the solicitude for them
among the world's great courts are foreign to American constitutional experience" are "wrong."
Id. at 598. Instead, "[i]n the 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court came extremely close to
recognizing such rights in a series of statutory and constitutional cases which produced remedial
schemes comparable to several under construction abroad." Id. at n.7. Forbath wants us to see
that a different result in the 1968 election might have lead to an entirely different history of
substantive rights in the Constitution. Id. at 612-13. Nonetheless, the dominant image of the
Constitution suggests that it never has-and implicitly never will-recognize such "affirmative"
rights. This is what Balkin worries about when he expresses concern about the psychological
impact of the imperative of constitutional fidelity:
Fidelity is a sort of servitude .... The Constitution becomes the focus of
our attention, the prism of our perspective. Our efforts are directed to
understanding it-and many other things in society as well-in terms of
its clauses, its concepts, its traditions. Through this discipline, this focus,
we achieve a sort of tunnel vision: a closing off to other possibilities that
would speak in a different language and think in a different way, a
closing off to worlds in which the Constitution is only one document
among many, worlds in which the Constitution is no great thing, but only
a first draft of something much greater and more noble.
Balkin, supra note 5, at 1726.
187 Balkin, supra note 5, at 1713.
188 See KAHN, supra note 1, at 7-30.
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For Benjamin, fidelity is precisely what we should be putting under
suspicion, precisely because it requires a faith that things will improve.
For Benjamin, such assertions are dangerous because they can blind us
to what is really happening in the present. Progressivism blinds us
because it insists that the Constitution follows a path of ever greater
freedom, and because it refuses to squarely confront the possibility that
forces from the past might still make themselves felt today.
A few examples may help make these criticisms more visible.
1. Race and Preservation Through Transformation
Consider first the legacy of slavery in our nation's constitutional
and political life. For progressives, slavery, even in the original,
unamended Constitution, is a relic of the old order. The passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment then solved any contradiction between the
democratic nature of the original Constitution and the system of chattel
slavery. Although we may have some tinkering to do in order to finally
cleanse our system of racism and the legacy of slavery, the heavy lifting
has been done, and indeed, was completed upon the passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
Unfortunately, the progressive account of slavery might fail to
understand the real effects of the Reconstruction Amendments. Saidiya
Hartman's attempt to theorize the period of Reconstruction from the
point of view of the freed slaves is a useful counterpoint here.
According to Hartman, for African-Americans, the Thirteenth
Amendment did not inaugurate a "definitive break between slavery and
freedom, compulsion and consent." 189 In the immediate aftermath of
the Thirteenth Amendment, slave labor was replaced by bonded labor
and debt peonage, which were in turn sustained by the Black Codes. 90
As a result, Hartman concludes that "[n]otwithstanding the negatory
power of the Thirteenth Amendment, racial slavery was transformed
rather than annulled."' 191 Progressivism thus blinds us to the causal
189 SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 130 (1997).
190 In some states, these Codes defined any black person not in possession of a labor contract
to be a vagrant. Id. at 145. Labor contracts administered by the Freedman's Bureau made "free"
black labor conditional upon behavior that precisely echoed the social roles of slavery: laborers
were to be "quiet" and "respectable" and "well-behaved." Id. at 147. A variety of other new laws
regulated subsistence activities such as hunting and fishing, or imposed severe penalties for
crimes that blacks were perceived as likely to commit. Id. at 146-47.
191 Id. at 10. Hartman also writes:
Certainly the freed came into "possession" of themselves and basic civil
rights consequent to the abolition of slavery. However, despite the
symbolic bestowal of humanity that accompanied the acquisition of
rights, the legacy of freedom was an ambivalent one. If the nascent
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nexus between slavery and the debt bondage that followed: both were
deeply rooted in economic systems dependent upon exploitation, and
the transition inaugurated by the Amendment was thus less a
transformation than a preservation of the old order. To see slavery as
cleanly superceded by the Thirteenth Amendment, such that its legacy
evaporates, is to render ourselves unable to see this causal nexus.
A progressive has two options in the face of this kind of historical
claim: He can reject the conclusion as bad history, or he can telescope
time, insisting that Reconstruction is the wrong place to look for racial
justice, and that we would be better off judging history according to the
vast improvements in racial equality that have taken place in the last
several decades. The latter move, of course, has its own dangers. As
Reva Siegel notes, status-preserving behavior is mutable, and can
evolve around legal attempts to interrupt it, a phenomenon she calls
"preservation-through-transformation."' 192 So, during Reconstruction,
the new constitutional mandate of racial equality was undermined by
the strict doctrinal separation between civil and political rights on the
one hand and social rights on the other, which justified practices and
policies that "perpetuated the racial stratification of American
society."'193 We witness much the same thing today, Siegel contends, in
an Equal Protection doctrine that no longer protects: "[D]octrines
concerning discriminatory purpose authorize certain forms of state
action that perpetuate racial stratification as consistent with
constitutional guarantees of equal protection."' 94 In both cases, the
notion of progress provided the necessary cover for these acts of
preservation, allowing institutions, and the white majority, the
comfortable sense that they had changed, when the reality of racial
hierarchy remained very much the same. 195 As Jack Balkin and Sanford
mantle of sovereign individuality conferred rights and entitlements, it
also served to obscure the coercion of "free labor," the transmutation of
bonded labor, the invasive forms of discipline that fashioned
individuality, and the regulatory production of blackness.
Id at 120.
192 See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119, 1129-31 (1997).
193 Id. at 1129.
194 Id. at 1130.
195 Siegel writes:
In the nineteenth century, the Court was confident that it had abolished slavery and
granted African-Americans equal protection of the laws. In this period, doctrines
concerning social rights authorized certain forms of state action that perpetuated racial
stratification as consistent with constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Today,
the Court is confident that it has abolished segregation and granted African-Americans
equal protection of the laws. Now, doctrines concerning discriminatory purpose
authorize certain forms of state action that perpetuate racial stratification as consistent
with constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
[Vol. 26:31092
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Levinson write, relying upon Siegel's work, "[t]he happy story of
progressive legal reform can mask the elements of unjust status
hierarchies that still remain, aided and abetted by the very rules that
purported to disestablish them."' 196
2. The Gay March Towards Freedom
Next, consider the recent trend in which progressives posit gay
men and lesbians as the next frontier in the march towards constitutional
freedom. In a palpable way, among liberal scholars gay is, so to speak,
the new black. I suspect, for example, that Lawrence Tribe speaks for
many of liberal constitutional scholars when he voices his view that
"[s]ame-sex marriage... is bound to follow [the Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas]; it is only a question of time." 197 Tribe assesses the
last few decades of race and sex jurisprudence, and concludes that "[i]t
is hard to imagine that the trajectory of same-sex marriage rights will
not follow the same path." 198
The November 2004 election, in which eleven states passed state
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage, and eight states
arguably banned civil unions as well, suggests that a different course is
entirely possible. 199 Advocates of the recent state amendments have
196 Further examples might be offered of this phenomenon. One can be drawn from Siegel's
work on the way that privacy law emerged to protect men's prerogatives to physically abuse their
wives at the same moment that notions of coverture broke down. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule
of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2179-81 (1996).
Another might focus on the recent debate about the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), and the evidence that schools today are nearly as segregated as they were on the
day that Brown was handed down. See Richard Thompson Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1305, 1305-06 (2004). Today's segregation is often considered both inevitable and
unproblematic (if also regrettable), because it is perceived to be the result of private preferences
on all sides of the racial divide. Richard Ford argues that these purportedly natural desires are in
fact legally constructed:
Legal rules, as much as private preferences, make segregation possible-indeed,
almost inevitable. Segregation is not simply the reflection of private preferences; it is
also the product of law. Segregation is therefore, in an important sense, a result of
public policy: a policy decision to acquiesce in and to subsidize the preferences of
those who prefer segregation at the expense of those who prefer integration.
Id. at 1306. According to Ford: "Today it's easy to pay lip service to the litigation that bears [the
Brown] name, comfortable in the presumption that the hard fights have long since been won," but
"if we want to make the promise of a socially, economically, and politically integrated society a
reality, we should stop celebrating a victory we've yet to win and start trying to breathe new life
into Brown's ghost." Id. at 1333. We cannot, of course, stop celebrating Brown as a conclusive
victory or adequately apply ourselves to its failures if we insist on placing it in a continuum of
history that casts structural racism as essentially defeated.
197 Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945 (2004).
198 Id. at 1947.
199 See Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at
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promised that an additional twelve to fifteen similar state constitutional
amendments will be presented to voters in the next two years, and they
are confident that a federal constitutional amendment will "move" in the
coming term of Congress.200 That is not, of course, what happened after
Loving v. Virginia,201 and it is hard to see how it matches the
progressive script, unless we telescope out to the infinite future and
insist that victory is inevitable. There is no way at present to know
whether amendments banning gay marriage will eventually be
overturned. The progressive who assumes that this outcome is
inevitable will, in the process, tend to minimize the harm done to those
who will suffer until then, for example, because they lose their health
insurance in states that disestablish domestic partnership rights for state
employees, or are denied permission to adopt their own children.
The desire to believe the progressive narrative may also make
those who oppose these amendments less vigorous in their opposition to
them. More surely, to paint such sweeping arcs of historical movement
is to suppress the forms of contestation that are, in fact, a part of all
political movements. In the progressive account, Lawrence is the new
Brown,202 and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,20 3 no doubt,
will be the new Loving. But consider Katherine Franke's recent
criticism of the Lawrence decision. Franke contends that the opinion
that Tribe celebrates "relies on a narrow version of liberty that is both
geographized and domesticated. '20 4 The Lawrence majority limits the
liberty it offers to the domestic private,20 5 and to sex that is connected to
a "more enduring" personal bond.206  Franke argues that this is
considerably inferior to the version of liberty imagined by the last
several decades of queer and gay organizing.20 7  The history of
contestation to which Franke refers is, of course, not visible to those
A16.
200 See the comments of Shannon Royce, Director of the Marriage Amendment Project, on
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Nov. 8., 2004, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-
dec04/gaymarriage 11-08.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
201 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (striking down Virginia's miscegenation law on federal
constitutional grounds).
202 Tribe, supra note 197, at 1894-95 (noting that "[ilt seems only fitting, if perhaps late in the
day, that Lawrence v. Texas should have been handed down just a year before the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education") (internal citations omitted).
203 798 N.E.2d 941, 971-72 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution
required the extension of marriage benefits to same sex couples).
204 Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1399, 1400 (2004).
205 Id. at 1403.
206 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
207 For arguments against the attempt to secure rights to same-sex marriage, see MICHAEL
WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999)
and Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Autumn
1989, at 8, partially reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 817 (1997).
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committed to a progress narrative. Nor does the sensibility of progress
permit us to wonder whether our new freedoms are either much the
same as what we once had, a form of preservation through
transformation, or even less than those that we once had.208 Finally, the
progressive lens disables us from imagining trajectories such as Franke
predicts: that gay marriage will follow upon the heels of Lawrence not
because freedom is on the march, but because opponents of gay
marriage will eventually find the existence of legally sanctioned sexual
relationships that are not regulated by the marriage contract
intolerable.209
One sometimes gets the sense that liberal constitutional scholars
speak in progressive tones less because they believe the ideology of
progress to be correct, than because of the special burden that they
believe comes with their relationship to the courts. Thus, Tribe rejects
the view of the many scholars who have expressed skepticism that
Lawrence will lead to rapid recognition of same-sex relationships,
declaring that he does not "feel swept up in the eagerness to sing such
notes of caution, while throwing caution to the winds when it comes to
courting the risk of making self-fulfilling prophesies. ' 2 °10 Such language
suggests that legal theorists who want to see gay marriage legalized
have an obligation to read Lawrence for all it is worth, because their
statements, unlike those of most historians, have a unique propensity to
become "self-fulfilling prophecies."
If this is true, then maybe we all ought to be progressives whether
or not we actually believe that freedom is on the march. But if
Benjamin is right about the dangers of progress narratives, this kind of
instrumentalism is not worth the candle. Experience gives us little
reason, after all, to think that academic articles have the strong self-
fulfilling capacity that Tribe suggests they might.211 This is not entirely
to dismiss Tribe's concern; after all, part of the appeal of academic legal
writing is its attenuated ability to influence doctrine. But the
mechanisms of this influence are difficult to predict or control, and
whatever influence does exist seems to occur despite the vast
differences of opinion expressed within scholarship over the likely or
proper direction of any particular doctrine. Writing progress narratives
208 Franke is precisely worried that the trajectory of the Lawrence decision will lead to less
freedom for those who engage in same-sex sex, and she thus encourages this community to
reconsider its "rush to law, to recognition, and to state sanction." Franke, supra note 204, at
1426.
209 Id.
210 Tribe, supra note 197, at 1950.
211 Tribe's articles may be the exception that proves the rule, but it is hard to see how even
Tribe can persuade a Court, in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, that there is only one
trajectory that complies with Lawrence. This is especially so when Tribe himself admits that he
aspires to have this effect. And of course, millions of trees have been felled in the service of
arguments that no court will ever adopt.
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in anticipation of a readership of attentive and suggestible judges is not,
I would venture, likely to do much good. It might, however, do
significant harm, if it results in arguments that are either disingenuous,
or that breed the kind of complacency about which Benjamin worried.
3. Civil Liberties in an Age of Terror
A final example of the dangers of the progressive attitude involves
progressive responses to encroachments upon civil liberties after
September 11, 2001. Consider these conclusions, propounded by Jack
Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein in 2002:
During every serious war in our nation's history, civil liberties have
been curtailed. Following (usually not during) each war, elites regret
these restrictions on civil liberties because the restrictions often
seem-from the ex post perspective when the danger of war has
passed and the true extent of the threats become known-to be
unwarranted or extreme. During the next war, the perceived abuses
during the last war are used as the baseline for determining which
civil liberties restrictions are appropriate. This dialectic produces a
ratchet effect, over time, in favor of more expansive civil liberties
during wartime. Of course there is nothing inevitable to this
process.... But in the American context, with a remarkable record
of military success, the historical trend has been toward increasing
suspicion of intrusions on civil liberty and civil rights, even when
national security seems to be at risk.212
Sunstein and Goldsmith posit a "ratchet" effect that is intended to
comfort us. Although the authors say that there is "nothing inevitable"
about this effect, their disclaimer is undermined by the trajectory of
their argument, which insists that we can, and should, place our faith in
the broad contours of the historical "trend" that they identify.
For Benjamin, the forces that produced excesses in the past may
well be with us today, and progressivism encourages a quietism that
leaves us blind to these forces and to possible disaster in our midst. If
all that we understand of Korematsu, for example, is that we will never
again see something like it, then we presume that nothing that could
even happen in Guantanamo Bay could be as bad as the Japanese
internment camps. The opposite conclusion, that Guantanamo must be
like the internment camps, is an equally bad assumption, of course. The
point, for Benjamin, is to approach the past and present without quietist
suppositions about what we will find, looking for historical forces at
work, in order to protect ourselves from falling victim to the same set of
212 Jack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference
Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMM. 261, 284-85 (2002).
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forces, each time in a different guise. For example, rather than insist
that civil liberties are always better protected in each war than the last,
we would do better to examine the forces that produced the
depredations of the past, and attempt to connect them to the threats of
the present. Instead of assessing threats to civil liberties on average, or
attempting to see in them a "trend," we ought, Benjamin would insist,
focus on the particular risks of today. None of this can come into view
as long as we are focused on a narrative of progress or insisting that
some things are simply no longer possible. Whether Korematsu can
ever happen again depends entirely upon what we understand
Korematsu to be, and upon whether or not we are willing to admit the
possibility that no guarantees of "never again" can be found in the
present or past.
IV. THE REDEMPTIVE ALTERNATIVE
When Benjamin inveighs against ideologies of progress he does
not suggest that we should resign ourselves to a long decline.213 The
opposite of progress is not decline. It is redemption. According to
Benjamin, the past "carries with it a [secret] index by which it is
referred to redemption, '214 and "only for a redeemed mankind has the
past become citable in all its moments. '215 I will first explicate
Benjamin's concept of redemption, which has a different sense of
temporality and agency than the modes of history previously described.
After elucidating Benjamin's concept of redemption, I will offer
examples of the redemptive approach to history in current constitutional
scholarship.
A. Benjamin's Concept of Redemption
The redemptive historian, for Benjamin, "cannot do without the
notion of a present that is not a transition, but in which time stands still
and has come to a stop. For this notion defines the present in which he
himself is writing history. '216  This is the first dimension of the
213 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 48. At times, therefore, Benjamin
expresses an interest in redefining the term progress, speaking of adopting a "militant concept of
progress," id. at 69, and defining true progress as "the first revolutionary measures taken," id. at
66. These both disarticulate the notion of progress from the Enlightenment certainty that
mankind's advance is predictable and automatic.
214 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
254.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 262. Benjamin calls this historian the "historical materialist," a term that of course
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redemptive approach to history: It is occupies the time of the present,
and "establishes a conception of the present" as something that
Benjamin calls the Jetztzeit.217 Jetztzeit designates the time that we are
always living in, an eternal present that stands outside the continuum of
time.218 It is not the "present, ' 219 but rather, is the place from which we
observe the present and past, and bring them together to make
history.220
Benjamin likens the redemptive historian to insurrectionists on the
first day of the French Revolution who, he says, fired at clock towers in
order to stop time.22' The redemptivist seeks to arrest time in this same
way, seeking to "supply a unique moment with the past," drawing his
authority from the Jetztzeit, rather than seeking authority in the past or
the future.22 2 Benjamin's insistence on the importance of the Jetztzeit is
first and foremost a claim about the importance of grasping our own
authority and agency in relation to history. The Jetztzeit is a time that is
susceptible to action, rather than a point in a predetermined continuum
or narrative where, as with narratives of progress or the authoritative
nature of monumental history, agency is always located elsewhere.
comes from the theory of Karl Marx. But Benjamin deploys this term in a different fashion than
Marx-and at times in a decidedly anti-Marxist way. In this context, it would therefore be
misleading to use Marx's term. I choose instead to refer to this historian as the "redemptive"
historian, because the concept of redemption is key to Benjamin's contribution to the philosophy
of history.
217 Id. at 261, 263.
218 Zohn translates Jetztzeit as the "presence of the now," but it is probably better translated as
the "eternal present." I thank Susan Gillespie for suggesting this to me.
219 Jetztzeit is distinct from the "present" (which, in German, is Gegenwart). This notion of a
past interpreted with direction from the present has Nietzschean roots, see, e.g., FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS 94 (R.J. Hollingsdale trans., 1983) ("If you are to venture
to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest exertion of the vigour of the present."),
and is opposed to a historicism that presents history as a reality knowable in its own terms,
uncontaminated with the needs of the present.
220 See Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 50 ("It isn't that the past casts its
light on what is present or that what is present casts its light on what is past; rather, an image is
that in which the Then and the Now come together in a constellation like a flash of lightening.").
Benjamin also writes:
For the materialist historian, every epoch with which he occupies himself is only a
fore-history of the one that really concerns him. And that is precisely why the
appearance of repetition doesn't exist for him in history, because given their index as
"fore-history," those moments in the course of history that matter most to him become
moments of the present and change their character according to whether this present is
defined as a catastrophe or a triumph.
Id. at 65; see also Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS,
supra note 8, at 263 (noting that the task of the historian is to understand "the constellation which
his own era has formed with a definite earlier one") (emphasis added).
221 "In the July revolution an incident occurred which showed [the redemptive] consciousness
still alive. On the first evening of the fighting it turned out that all the clocks in towers were
being fired on simultaneously and independently from several places in Paris." Walter Benjamin,
Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at 262.
222 The redemptive historian thus seeks to "make the continuum of history explode." Id. at
261.
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The redemptive historian is, in Benjamin's terms, "in control of his
powers, man enough to blast open the continuum of history. '223
Benjamin believes above all in the vitality of the present as the moment
that we seize. 224 Spontaneity and action are the terms that Benjamin
associates with redemption, and they are precisely opposed to the
meticulous self-abnegation that Ranke seeks for the historian. Put
differently, redemptive arguments trade Ranke's God for Benjamin's
profane Messiah. Whereas Ranke believes that the historian's efforts
"stem from a higher, religious source," 225 Benjamin insists that "[1]ike
every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. 2 26 The
meanings of history are made by us. They exist only as our potential,
and are not awaiting discovery in the past.
It is now more clear, therefore, why Benjamin understands the
historicist and progressive modes of history as catastrophic: Both, in
different ways, use history to assign agency to somewhere other than
the Jetztzeit, as part of sometimes deliberate attempts to eviscerate our
collective capacity for change. They also, in different ways, claim a
universality for the history that they tell. Progressive histories claim to
understand the People's collective destination with certainty, and
historicist histories claim to offer definitive interpretations of the past.
But for Benjamin, there can be no universal or definitive history,
because the domain of interpretation is not definitive, and because the
Jetztzeit is always presenting us with new historical images to interpret.
For Benjamin, no history can ever incorporate all of the moments
of the past, just as no constellation can include all of the stars. Full
redemption, or the perfection of mankind, as noted above, would only
be Judgment Day; it would not have any political meaning.227 In
historical terms, this means that no history can capture the totality of the
possible meanings of events in the past. We must always be prepared,
therefore, to seize new images that the juxtaposition of present and past
offers us, in order to achieve not religious redemption, but "profane
illumination" in our own time.228 Profane illumination occurs in
political, as opposed to sacred, time-it is the product of our own
223 Id. at 262.
224 Walter Benjamin, One Way Street, in ONE WAY STREET, supra note 19, at 45, 99. ("Each
morning the day lies like a fresh shirt on our bed; this incomparably fine, incomparably woven
tissue of pure prediction fits us perfectly. The happiness of the next twenty-four hours depends
on our ability, on waking, to pick it up.").
225 Ranke, supra note 45, at 38.
226 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
254.
227 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
228 Benjamin notes, in his writings on Surrealism, that "the true, creative overcoming of
religious illumination ... resides in profane illumination, a materialistic, anthropological
inspiration." Walter Benjamin, Surrealism, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 38, at 177, 179.
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commitment and interpretive efforts, rather than of an inheritance that
we receive from the past, or the movement of world-historical forces
into the future.
But what motivates and attributes value to such histories, if not
certainty? I began to explore this question above, in Part II, in the
discussion of the fallacies of historicism. History can be "true" to the
facts, but facts do not themselves arbitrate between histories that are
equally faithful to the facts. To invoke Bernard Williams again,
although there are many histories that are true, there is "no such thing as
'the truth' about the historical past. '229 In order to sort between true
histories, we need a criterion that is external to the facts themselves.
How, then, are we to measure a historical image, in Benjamin's view?
If there is no "final" or ultimately true history, is there at least a best
history? Would anyone engage in historical analysis-including
Benjamin-if she did not believe that she could claim to be writing a
better history than others had written?
To put the question more pointedly, and in the terms that a lawyer
might, if we can agree upon a historical question, which may be easier
to do in the field of law than in that of history, can we find one best
answer to it? Benjamin's answer is "no," if objectivity is the measure
of that history. There are too many ways to configure the facts or
attribute meaning and authority to them to make facts themselves the
judge of history. But Benjamin's answer is "yes" if actuality, rather
than truthfulness or objectivity, is used to evaluate the history. For
Benjamin, "current relevance or actuality is a quality of the event, a
quality that one can never find already in place but that one must
construct. '230 Historical images, he insists, are measured according to
what they do, by the insight and action that they spark in the present.
He understood present day engagement, and in particular, political
engagement, to be the only motivator of truly insightful history.23' For
Benjamin, the best history relates the past to current struggles, and helps
229 WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 257. Williams squarely rejects the conclusion that all
historical truths are, as a result, relative in the radical sense of the term:
People use the word "relativism" here, perhaps, because they have a correct sense that
the differences underlying these disagreements are basically political, or ethical, or at
the very least temperamental. If we do speak of relativism of historical interpretation,
however, we should not contrast it with "objectivity."
Id. at 260-61. Williams here wants to avoid the assumption that history must always be "biased,"
because he does believe that some histories can be true to the facts, which in his terminology,
means they are not biased.
230 Norbert Bolz, Aesthetics? Philosophy of History? Theology!, in BENJAMIN'S GHOSTS 226,
230 (Gerhard Richter ed. & trans., 2002).
231 For example, he insisted that "[flor lack of any active political focus, historicism reduces
everything to an endless panoramic blur." Irving Wohlfarth, Et Cetera? The Historian as
Chiffonnier, 39 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 142, 164 (1986) (describing Benjamin's theory of
history).
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us see forces or possibilities that help us redeem lost possibilities in the
past.2 32
Finally, redemptive history differs from the other modes by the
character of its prototypical act, which is the attempt "to brush history
against the grain. '233 A redemptive history views hallowed documents
and events with a "cautious detachment. ' 234 It does not disregard them,
or sanctify them, but rather seeks to unravel their authority and free the
present from their domesticating force "by exhibiting the discontinuity"
that exists within them.235
The redemptive historian strives to make felt the truly new by
transcending, rather than simply rewriting, tradition. Transcendence
[aufheben] is a key concept here. Benjamin borrows the term from
Hegel, and uses it to invoke a dialectical movement that at once
preserves, elevates, and cancels. 236 Benjamin seeks to transform rather
than simply invert or replace traditions: "In every era," Benjamin
writes, "the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a
conformism that is about to overpower it.' '237 The act that Benjamin has
in mind produces a new tradition, a counter-tradition, and also changes
the notion of what a tradition is, by no longer claiming definitive status
for it, or seeking to draw its authority from anywhere but the present.
Instead of engaging in "appreciation or apologia," or "cover[ing] up the
revolutionary moments in the course of history," 238 the redemptivist
seeks "those jags and crags that offer a handhold to someone who
wishes to move beyond" the progressive and historicist accounts. 239
The redemptive approach to history opens itself up to all of the
past, even to the "trash" of history.240 Redemptive arguments, in
232 As Bernard Williams puts it, "the dimensions of disagreement involved [in history] are not
simply a matter of knowledge or explanation or to be resolved by further historical inquiry. They
are matters of the needs of the various parties, and of their relations to people who have other
needs." WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 260. Benjamin was not a liberal or a proceduralist, of
course. While Williams focuses on the ability of histories to allow different groups to speak to
and understand the needs of one another, Benjamin emphasized the ability of history to engage
the fighting spirit of those who had always been on the losing side of history.
233 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
257.
234 Id.
235 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 63. Benjamin likened the method of
his Arcades project to "the splitting of the atom [which] releases the enormous energy of history
that lies bonded in the 'Once upon a time' of classical historical narrative. The history that
showed things 'as they really were' was the strongest narcotic of the century." Id. at 51.
236 See Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note
8, at 263.
237 Id. at 255.
238 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 64.
239 Id. at 65.
240 Id. at 47 (noting that the method of his Arcades project was to "[o]nly exhibit.., the trivia,
the trash-which I don't want to inventory, but simply allow to come into its own in the only way
possible: by putting it to use").
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Benjamin's conception, use the past to free up rather than constrain
interpretation, to make new meanings in the present, rather than
reiterate meanings that were ostensibly fixed in the past. To do this, and
to make good on the potentiality that resides in the present, the
redemptivist needs access to all of the past.24' In fact, the redemptive
approach focuses disproportionately on these discarded or disregarded
elements of the past, because it is this that other methodologies bury.
The trash of history is particularly important to Benjamin because it
provides us with material that can help us undo dominant narratives of
tradition and progress. Most useful here, Benjamin thinks, are the
residues of victories and solutions that are never fully achieved, and the
remnants of those who have lost in the past. That is because Benjamin
believes that it is those who struggle who are the "[subject] of historical
knowledge. '242 This class is not the working class, but "the struggling,
oppressed class itself. ' 243  And it is knowledge, crucially, that it
provides us with.
This is an important point. Benjamin's critical, disruptive
methodology is not reducible to his own political commitment to
improving the lot of the dispossessed. It also derives from his
understanding of epistemology, and of the Jetztzeit. He believed that
only by understanding and working to liberate those who still struggle
can we awaken from the dream of history,244 because narratives of
tradition and progress anesthetize us and limit our powers of perception.
These narratives need to be undone in order to allow us to see, and to
feel. By considering the lot of those who currently struggle, and by
seeking to brush history against the grain, we can properly actualize the
potential of the present. We owe this not to the past, but to ourselves.
B. Constitutional Redemptivists
We can discern numerous examples of redemptive methodology in
current constitutional thought, although they are less prevalent than
examples of either historicist or progressive methodologies. Several
241 id, at 57:
Every historical perception can be visualized by substituting the image of a pair of
scales, one pan of which is weighted with what was, the other with a recognition of
what now is. While the facts collected on the first pan can never be too trivial or too
numerous, only a few heavy, massive weights need lie on the other.
242 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
260.
243 Id. For Marx, Benjamin writes, this struggling class was the proletariat, "the last enslaved
class, . . . the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the
downtrodden." Id.
244 Walter Benjamin, N, in BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 52 ("[E]very presentation [of] history
must begin with awakening; in fact, it should deal with nothing else.").
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qualities define redemptive claims about constitutional meaning.
Redemptive arguments are characterized by criticality, by an attempt to
disrupt narratives of heritage or progress. They seek to place narratives
about cultural treasures under suspicion, brushing them against the
grain. In the service of this effort, they focus disproportionately on the
trash and tragedy of history. They are convinced that we learn more
from investigating the worst of our constitutional past than we do from
looking to the best. They believe that we are likely to see and achieve
more by seeking to undo our failures than by seeking to improve upon
our successes. Finally, they believe in and embrace the authority of the
present, which they see as shot through with, but not governed by, the
past. They look to the past to render us able to see, and to feel, the
possibilities of the present.
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson are two of the foremost theorists
of redemptive constitutionalism today. Balkin declares that "the point
of Constitutional government... is the eventual redemption in history
of the principles of our Founding document," a document that in true
redemptive form, is not the Constitution, but rather the Declaration of
Independence. 245 Constitutional redemption is, for Balkin, an endless
quest because "democracies always exist and have existed in societies
shaped by existing social hierarchies and previous injustices.
Democracies always live in social conditions partially hostile to the
attainment of democratic ideals. '246 Writing together, Levinson and
Balkin express concern about the power of the progressive tendency in
constitutional thought to foster complacency. 247  They want us to
understand the present to be in a kind of danger, and the evils of the past
to never be definitively overcome.2 48 They dissociate themselves from
245 Jack M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WID. L.
SYMp. J. 167, 167 (1999).
246 Id. at 175.
247 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 104, at 989. They write:
The story of inevitable progress has allowed progressives to harmonize the injustices of
the past with their aspirations for the future. In the progressive imagination, principles
immanent at the time of the Revolution (or the founding or Reconstruction) unfold and
are realized through historical struggle, emerging and working themselves pure from
the parochialism and injustices of the past.
Id.
248 Balkin, supra note 245, at 176 ("A narrative of redemption worships neither the past nor
the present. To the contrary: it assumes that we exist, and always have existed, in a fallen
condition. We live in compromises with the evils of the past, and we are compromised by
them.") Balkin also notes that "[tihe mistake of originalism as conventionally understood is that
it takes too seriously the understandings of a past generation. It mistakes past compromises with
injustice for the meaning ofjustice." Id. at 177. He similarly takes aim at what Benjamin sought
to discredit in the Idealist philosophy of history:
The story of our country is not a Hegelian story in which the oak is already contained
in the acorn.... The future is something that we make, with our narrative self-
understanding as our goad and guide. In every generation it is given to us to redeem
the promises of the Declaration in new ways.
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strong claims to the truth of their constitutional interpretations, taking
interest more in the effect such interpretations can have in the present.249
Levinson and Balkin also strongly advocate a move away from a
constitutional canon that consists solely of the statements of learned
justices and law professors. 250 In a recent article, Levinson explains
why he does not intend ever again to teach first semester constitutional
law students in the United States the canonical case of Marbury v.
Madison.251 He argues that a rich and deep historical analysis is
necessary to any attempt to really understand Marbury, or any judicial
opinion, for that matter, and that this attempt is not impossible, in the
case of Marbury, but instead is a poor use of class time. If students are
going to spend time in class learning constitutional history they should,
Levinson believes, "do it about something that is truly important. '252
Importance, for Levinson, is measured in everyday political terms: it
ought to address "issues that truly matter, whether to our students or to
ourselves." 253
The most important history to teach students, Levinson suggests, is
the history of chattel slavery in the United States, because an
understanding of that history is necessary to "thinking of what might be
required to overcome it.' '254 Only by understanding the historical past
of slavery, not through "dreadful" canonical texts such as the Civil
Rights Cases, but rather, through the lived experience of blacks in post-
Reconstruction America, can we address the persistent present day
effects of the "peculiar institution." A further reason Levinson gives to
Id. at 177-78. Finally, he insists on the kind of actuality that Benjamin put first: a redemptive
account of constitutional history, Balkin insists, "does not claim that the eventual redemption is
assured. It claims only that we should strive to achieve it.... It does not say that redemption
will occur without any effort on our part; it says that we must make the story true." Id. at 178;
see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 1720 ("The aspirationalist vision is one of redemption. There
can be no redemption without the recognition of sin. Thus, even at the moment when we want to
read the Constitution as aspiring to great justice, we must soberly reflect on its evils, both
potential and realized.").
249 See e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642
(1989). Levinson notes:
It is not my style to offer "correct" or "incorrect" interpretations of the Constitution.
My major interest is in delineating the rhetorical structures of American constitutional
argument and elaborating what is sometimes called the "politics of interpretation," that
is, the factors that explain why one or another approach will appeal to certain analysts
at certain times ....
Id.
250 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 104, at 965-68 (suggesting that Fredrick Douglass's 1860
speech in Glasgow asserting that the Constitution leaned towards freedom rather than slavery,
ought to be included in constitutional law case books alongside Chief Justice Roger Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
251 Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except To Eastern Europeans) and Why
You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003).
252 Id. at 559.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 560.
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teach a detailed history of chattel slavery is that this helps guard against
"an unjustified optimism in students that the American constitutional
system, including judicial decisions, has happy endings, that it never
serves as a mechanism for legitimizing evil. ' 255 In true redemptive
form, Levinson worries about the predominance of progress narratives,
and the propensity of such narratives to blind us to historical forces that
continue to be felt today.
But perhaps the most well known theorist of the redemptive
Constitution is Thurgood Marshall. In his oft-cited speech on the
occasion of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, Marshall inveighs
against those who would simply use the occasion to celebrate the vision
of the Founders. He rejects such hagiography because "the government
they devised was defective from the start, requiring several
amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain
the systems of constitutional government, and its respect for the
individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental
today. '256  The credit for the Constitution's evolution towards
redemption, Marshall insists, "does not belong to the Framers. It
belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of
'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to better them. '257
Rather than commemorate hallowed constitutional traditions or figures
and engage in a "blind pilgrimage" to the shrine of the original
document, he encourages us to "commemorate the suffering, the
struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong
with the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not
realized and promises not fulfilled. '258
Two constitutional scholars who seek to meet Marshall's challenge
are Risa L. Goluboff and James Gray Pope. Both turn to history to
uncover images of struggle and suffering that have not yet been
redeemed. Their mode is one of rescue; they seek to uncover lost
possibilities in our constitutional past, and relate them to political
struggles in the present to give them new life. Goluboff, for example,
has written several meticulous histories of the lost intersections between
race and class in the struggle for civil rights. In one, she explores the
255 Id. at 561.
256 Thurgood Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
257 Id. at 5.
258 Id. As Norman Spaulding puts it, Marshall's speech, and in particular his insistence that
the Constitution did not survive the Civil War "is, in short, a provocative and revealing
'reversal,' .. .- an invitation to remember something we have always already forgotten,
something always already exposed to the cathectic predations of collective memory." Spaulding,
supra note 7, at 2026. Although at times Marshall adopts a progressive cadence-noting that the
Constitution has gone from slavery to respect for individual freedoms-his insistence that we
ought to disrupt the commemorative tendency, and focus upon hopes still unfulfilled, is
quintessentially redemptive.
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different ways that lawyers in the Civil Rights Section of the
Department of Justice framed civil rights claims in the 1940s.259 By
looking for this past, a past of arguments that did not become
constitutionally authoritative, she seeks to paint a picture of "a
framework for a labor-infused civil rights that has, for the most part,
been lost. ' 260 She makes the same kind of argument in a more recent
article that draws upon labor and property complaints that black
southern agricultural workers submitted to the NAACP that did not end
up forming any significant part of that organization's litigation or
advocacy strategy. 261 Her argument is intended to demonstrate that
"choices were made, ' 262 and that there is "neither a natural correlation
between race and rights nor a historical one. 263
James Gray Pope adopts a similar methodology when he seeks to
explicate the labor movement's lost "Constitution of Freedom. '264 For
evidence of this Constitution, Pope looks not to the intentions of the
Framers, but rather to the constitutional arguments that labor organizers
of the 1920s developed and used to mobilize political action outside and
against the court system. He insists on a need for "depth and detail" in
his case study, and privileges decidedly unauthoritative constitutional
sources like those penned by workers engaged in wildcat strikes and
open defiance of judicial injunctions. 265 He names workers' struggle for
their Constitution of freedom "one instance of a broader phenomenon:
constitutional insurgency," which takes place not through, but despite
and outside of, formal legal institutions.2 66 He finds a value in these
unofficial constitutional arguments "not only because they might
become official, but also because they can shape the consciousness and
action of adherents in the here and now. ' 267 Rather than being directed
primarily at courts, Pope's histories address themselves to contemporary
259 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609,1613 (2001).
260 Id. at 1615.
261 Risa L. Goluboff, "We Live's in a Free House Such as it Is": Class and the Creation of
Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1977 (2003). Goluboff seeks, in the article, to
"recapture the nascent rights claims of southern agricultural workers largely overlooked by the
[NAACP] Inc. Fund," and suggests that this recapturing offers us two lessons: "First, their very
existence at the intersection of race and class undermines the historiography's description of a
temporal shift from one to the other," and "second .... choices were made ... [and] [u]ntil now,
it has been impossible to see these critical choices because historians have ignored the potential
cases the Inc. Fund left behind." Id. at 1979-80.
262 Id. at 1980.
263 Id. at 1978.
264 James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997).
265 Id. at 945.
266 Id. at 943. Pope therefore emphasizes the way that labor organizers made arguments-and
even sought to enforce them-outside of the official court system, and in opposition to it. Id. at
967-77.
267 Id. at 944.
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attempts to rejuvenate the labor movement and offer it a "strong
consciousness of fundamental rights. 268
In these arguments, Pope and Goluboff direct their historical
interpretations less at courts than at our collective understandings of our
constitutional present and past.269 They seek not more authoritative
constitutional meanings, but new or renewed constitutional readings that
might be pressed by movements that engage with courts and
legislatures, and thereby become authoritative.
There are also examples of redemptive arguments that address
themselves more directly to the courts, in an attempt to construct new
interpretive paradigms through which we can understand the
Constitution's text. Two recent articles in particular occupy this mode.
The first is Norman Spaulding's attempt to elucidate a method of
"countermemory" to apply to the Reconstruction Amendments in the
context of contemporary disputes about federalism. The second is Reva
Siegel's attempt to recast the history of the Nineteenth Amendment in
terms that resonate with and inform today's conflicts about the scope of
Congressional power.
Spaulding begins by describing recent efforts in Germany to
memorialize the Holocaust, or more accurately, the "'absence"' 270 it
generated, through the creation of "countermonuments." A
countermonument (Gegen-Denkmal) is an anti-monumental monument,
a memorial that tries to resist the tendency of monuments to "'displace
the past they would have us contemplate,"' and "'the authoritarian
propensity in all art that reduces the viewer to passive spectator.' ' 271
With this project in mind, Spaulding raises the specter of the American
past of chattel slavery and segregation, 272 and poses this question to
268 James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to
Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941, 948 (1999).
269 Pope's measure of success is noteworthy here. At the end of his Yale Law Journal article,
he lays claim not to possessing a definitive or universally true history, but rather hopes that his
account has provided "original[ity] of perspective,... authenticity as a reflection of working
class experience and interpretive thinking,... cognitive depth, and ... implementation in a
collective action evincing strong commitment." Pope, supra note 264, at 1027.
270 Spaulding, supra note 7, at 1993 (quoting JAMES E. YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY:
HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS AND MEANING 45 (1993)).
271 Id. at 1995 (quoting YOUNG, supra note 269, at 28). Spaulding offers several examples of
these monuments. One, for example, is a hollow pillar filled with lead that sinks into the ground,
and that permits visitors to write on--even to desecrate-the structure. In an inscription, the
architects invite visitors and residents of the town "to add their names here to ours. In doing so,
we commit ourselves to remain vigilant. As more and more names cover this twelve meter tall
lead column, it will gradually be lowered into the ground. One day it will have disappeared
completely, and the site of the Harburg monument against fascism will be empty. In the end, it is
only we ourselves who can rise up against injustice." Id. (quoting YOUNG, supra note 270, at 28,
30).
272 Id. at 2000 (contending that "[c]hattel slavery and segregation are historical injustices of a
magnitude not unlike the crimes responsible for the problem of memory Germany now
confronts").
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himself: "Can a constitution be written or read against itself? Or is
constitutional law accessible only in monumental form, with all its
didactic, demagogic, and amnesic liabilities? '273
In the process of arguing that the Constitution should be read
against itself in just this way, at least in the specific context of the
Reconstruction Amendments, 274 Spaulding develops a method of
oppositional reading that he calls "countermemory." It is a mode that
strongly resonates with the method of redemptive constitutionalism;
"Countermemory is defined by a principle of resistance. It resists not
only the self-aggrandizing, didactic logic of what Nietzsche calls
'monumental history' but the paralyzing, preservationist impulse of
'antiquarian history,' and even the truth-seeking revisionism of 'critical
history.' ' 275 Like redemptivism, it does not give upon on historical
facts,276 and it "not only depends upon and excavates resistance, it
provokes it.''277
Using this method, Spaulding takes aim at the Supreme Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence, and the robust notion of states' rights
and limited federal powers that cases such as Morrison and Lopez
resurrect.278 Specifically, he draws upon three countermemories that the
federalist revivalists repress: the fact of southern succession, the fact
that the Reconstruction Amendments were ratified through coercive
means, and the fact of the failed reconciliation that was the original
273 Id.
274 Id. at 2001 (citing Marshall, supra note 256, at 4). In fact, Spaulding contends (after
Thurgood Marshall), that the Constitution did not survive the Civil War, and that the
Reconstruction Amendments must therefore be read as fundamentally altering the kind of
federation that we presume was preserved for the present day. Spaulding suggests that we all
know, in some sense, that Marshall is right, but conclude that his insight cannot be taken into
account because of the weighty responsibility that judges and academics as lawgivers must
shoulder. Spaulding casts this as a kind of repression-as symptom that and marks a site of
necessary analytic work. Id. at 2029.
275 Id. at 2003.
276 Id. (insisting that countermemory does not accept "subordination to metaphysical truth or
the search for an actual past"). I take Spaulding here to mean "actual" in the sense of "definitive"
or "objective," rather than factual-given his evident concern for the facts of the period of the
Civil War and Reconstruction.
277 Id. at 2004. Spaulding continues, "It recalls absences, isolates and emphasizes facts
inconvenient to coherence and emotional appeal of collective memory and national identity
(without, at the same time, permitting any facile incorporation of these facts back into the national
narrative)." Id. Countermemory has in common with redemptivism too; it seeks to transcend
traditional histories and collective memories, rather than simply displace or replace them. And it
anticipates this process as one that is difficult, one that will bring us into contact with a sense of
danger that we generally repress. See id. at 2049 ("[R]eading the Reconstruction Amendments as
countermonuments will prove exceptionally difficult memory work for anyone committed to the
elaboration of a reassuring national narrative. It promises not a comforting play of recognitions
but a frustrating labor of exposing and provoking resistance.").
278 These cases, Spaulding asserts, are "viable only as an expression of the monumental
historical consciousness-that is to say, only as the result of memory work predicated on
forgetting the structural significance of the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments." Id. at
2006.
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Thirteenth Amendment. 279  These rarely-discussed aspects of our
constitutional past, which carve out something like the negative space of
the Reconstruction Amendments, should lead us to conclude that the
Constitution that did survive the War was a fundamentally altered one,
and that the notion of federalism that existed before the war could not
have survived its crucible. He concludes: "Viewed from the perspective
of countermemory, the Reconstruction Amendments cannot be read,
and first principles of robust federalism cannot be invoked, without
considering the 'differences between what might have been and what
came to be.' The federalism revival depends upon forgetting these
differences." 280
Spaulding's argument is fundamentally redemptive in that he seeks
to "recover meaning the Reconstruction Amendments appear never to
have been given,"'28' much in the way that Benjamin suggests the
redemptive historian "reads that which was never written. '28 2 There is
one important difference, of course, between Spaulding's vision and the
one that I have articulated here: Spaulding suggests that the practice of
countermemory ought only be deployed in response to "mass historical
injustices," and that it is most appropriate where such misdeeds have
marked "the emergence of a new order or the survival or restoration of
an old one. '28 3  There is something monumental about the
circumstances for which Spaulding wants to reserve the "strong
medicine" 284  of countermemory. Redemptive histories, or
countermemories, may be easiest to discern and articulate where the
injustices of the past are most apparent, but why ought they be limited
to such circumstances? Would we not need countermemories all the
279 Id. at 2036-37.
280 Id. at 2048 (quoting HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND THE RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 47 (1973)).
281 The full quote is worth reiterating here:
How can we recover meaning the Reconstruction Amendments appear never to have
been given? Within a monumentalist mode of thinking about federalism and
Reconstruction, answers to this question cannot emerge. Imagined first principles will
always overshadow the events surrounding Reconstruction. The impulse to build a
reassuring narrative from those events will always suppress their more disturbing and
more radical implications. And, in the long shadow of robust federalism, the
Reconstruction Amendments may appear to mean even less than they say, may literally
become mere monuments, frozen in time, receding into obscurity, perhaps even
vanishing entirely from collective consciousness and constitutional law.
Id. at 2023.
282 Daniel Heller-Roazen, Editor's Introduction: To Read What Was Never Written, in
POTENTIALITIES, supra note 34, at 1, 1 (citing and translating from notes for Benjamin's Theses,
supra note 14).
283 Id. at 2004 ("Strong medicine should be sparingly prescribed, but ... countermemory is an
important technique for resisting the elisions mass historical injuries invite in the collective
memory of their perpetrators and beneficiaries.")
284 Id.
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more in those places where a rupture is hidden, and not manifest in a
Civil War, or a series of radical constitutional amendments?
Reva Siegel's recent attempt to reread the Nineteenth Amendment
offers another example of redemptive constitutional practice, one that
takes a less monumental approach to the sites of constitutional meaning
to which it applies itself. In her article, Siegel seeks to "interpret the
Nineteenth Amendment in terms that recollect, rather than repress, the
history of the suffrage campaign. ' 285 It is a present day struggle, and in
particular the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, that drives
Siegel's effort to extract forgotten elements of our constitutional past.
She is concerned that the "[e]rasure of the Nineteenth Amendment from
our collective memory and constitutional canon has helped produce a
body of sex discrimination law that lacks foundation in our
constitutional history and that defines equal protection formalistically,
as a constraint on state action that draws group-based distinctions
between men and women. 286
Siegel returns to the sixty-odd years of debate that preceded the
Amendment's passage in order to elaborate not a historicist history but a
redemptive one. She points out that women's suffrage could not make
sense without a dramatic shift in the imagined relationship between
women and family and also the federal government. Prior to the debate
surrounding the Amendment, Americans believed that "women were
represented in the state through male heads of household and [that]
enfranchising women would harm the marriage relationship. '" 287 In
order to be able to make women's suffrage appear as a right, the
relationship between the concepts of suffrage and family had to change.
Before it was possible for We the People to say that "the right of the
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by... any state on account of sex," 288 the imagined relationship
between local self-government and federal law also had to change.
Siegel presents a thoroughly historical argument, but crucially, it is
not an argument about intent, or the historicist meaning of the
Amendment. Siegel is committed not to original meanings laid down
by the framers of the constitutional text, but to understanding the
political shift inaugurated by women's demands for full citizenship.
285 See Siegel, supra note 150 at 1030.
286 Id. at 1022. Siegel points out that the impoverished history of the Nineteenth Amendment
that is told is intimately related to the continued subordination of women. Thus, "spousal" rape
exemptions and differential penalties for forms of domestic as compared to other kinds of assault
do not trigger heightened scrutiny as long as they are applied "equally"-in the formal sense-to
women and men. Siegel argues that this is because sex discrimination jurisprudence has not paid
attention either to the history of the role of law in the subordination of women, or to the issue of
how women's role in the family conditions their political citizenship. Id. at 1025-26.
287 Id. at 951.
288 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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She seeks to undo the dominant, ahistorical reading of the Nineteenth
Amendment that reduces it to a clause about voting rights; she attempts
to disrupt this narrative by demonstrating that the traditional view is
incoherent because it was not possible to make a national statement
about women's voting rights without also making a statement about
family and federation.289
By challenging traditional readings of the Amendment, Siegel
offers us new ways to understand the constellation that the fight for
women's suffrage forms with our own era.290 The article's relation to
past wrongs is also much more redemptive than progressive: Siegel
insists on the centrality of past wrongs and lost meanings to a genuine
historical analysis, 291 and on the importance of articulating "a narrative
of wrong and rectification" to our ability to posit the meaning of terms
like justice and equality today. 292
Finally, Siegel insists that she unearths this history not to constrain
judgment but to inform it.293 In the end, she appeals not primarily to
courts, but rather to "our self-accountings as a constitution-making
people," 294 imagining a constitutional change that occurs not primarily
via judicial pronouncement, but rather through a shift in our
constitutional language and sense of history, which may only eventually
change the way courts are able or willing to speak about constitutional
meaning. Siegel seeks not the pronouncement of a new constitutional
tradition, but a historically mediated shift in how "we know ourselves as
a nation and a people-as a collective subject acting in history, the
collective subject of the Constitution's preamble. '295
There are no doubt other examples of the redemptive mode of
constitutional argument, and we should not expect that they will
necessarily all occupy the leftward end of the political spectrum.296
289 See Siegel, supra note 150, at 1045 ("For nineteenth-century Americans, voting was the
central question of women's citizenship-'the woman question.' Nineteenth-century Americans
knew what woman's suffrage signified, even if its full significance to them is no longer legible to
us today.").
290 Siegel assumes, therefore, that historical constitutional thinking is always a project of
reconfiguring "We the People" today: "It is through the past that we make pragmatic judgments
about the ways we can best realize constitutional commitments and values in the present, and by
appeal to the past that we know ourselves as a collective subject acting in history, united
imaginatively and ethically across generations as well as communities." Id. at 1032.
291 Id. at 961, 1043 (discussing the centrality of "the history of women's treatment in the
American legal system").
292 Id. at 1043 (referring to United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996)).
293 Id. at 1031. Thus she writes: "Knowing this constitutional history does not compel a
particular outcome in the Morrison case, but it surely ought to inform the way we reason about
the constitutional questions Morrison presents." Id
294 Id. at 1046.
295 Id.
296 Examples from the other end of the political spectrum are, however, harder to come by.
One might be "abortion abolitionists," the self-styled radical fringe of the anti-abortion
movement. They seek to mobilize the symbolic capital of the anti-slavery movement, for
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These examples help demonstrate the redemptive mode in practice, and
its qualities of criticality, presentism, and disproportionate concern with
constitutional failures over constitutional successes. They also help us
understand what kind of thinking and action redemptive constitutional
arguments enable. Redemptivism promises us improved powers of
perception, to see clearly new possibilities for happiness and danger in
the present. It unsettles us and allows new narratives of the past and
present to emerge. Redemptive arguments also help dismantle
authoritative claims that sap the vitality of the present. They present the
past as ours to use, and use it to take apart triumphalist historicist and
progressive narratives that serve to justify the status quo.
Does redemptivism hold its own dangers? Is it compatible not just
with historical thinking, but also with law? It is to these final questions
that I now turn.
CONCLUSION: NECESSARY REDEMPTION
In the preceding pages, I have argued that each of Benjamin's
categories of historical methodology is at work in contemporary
constitutional discourse. Our constitutional order is dominated by the
approaches toward history that Benjamin calls historicism and
progressivism. Constitutional historicism aspires to definitive historical
interpretations, and asserts, usually via the fiction of collective consent,
that history itself has constitutional authority. Its problem is two-fold:
Historical narratives are neither scientific nor definitive in nature, and
no history is in itself authoritative, even in constitutional context.
Claims of constitutional authority are always interpretive acts.
Historicism disavows this, denying its own responsibility for the
decisions it takes, and the agency of the Jetztzeit, in the process.
example, by analogizing between the legal personhood of slaves and the legal personhood of
fetuses. They are also dedicated revisiting a constitutional consensus (Roe v. Wade) in their own
attempt to undo what they consider to be an ongoing constitutional tragedy. See, e.g., Charles
Colson, Staying Power: Abortion Battle May be Won Later Rather than Sooner, available at
http://www.euthanasia.com/slavery.html. They are also eclectic in the sources that they draw
upon, focusing less on the legal canon than upon sources with high symbolic salience, including
the international criminal trials at Nuremberg. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1129-30
(11 th Cir. 2002) (discussing the controversy over the "Nuremberg Files" website that included
photographs of doctors who provided abortions). Another recent movement associated with the
rightward end of the political spectrum, the attempt to reclaim the individual rights aspect of the
Second Amendment. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996), may have some redemptive
aspects, but has been, for the most part, thoroughly historicist in its approach. See Saul Cornell,
Commonplace or Anachronism: the Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of
History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMM. 221, 221-22 (1999).
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Historicism also threatens to reiterate our past of constitutional
exclusion into the present, because it sharply limits its field of vision to
those aspects of the past that appear to generate definitive and
authoritative histories. Historicists rely disproportionately upon sources
that can be readily accessed and summarized, without regard for
whether these sources best represent the views of the People from
whom historicists claim to derive authority. They also elide the vast
changes that have occurred over the centuries in who counts as an
authorized constitutional subject, in order to claim that the turn to the
past always serves the democratic present. But this claim fails when we
acknowledge that there is no ahistorical identity between We the People
today and We the People who made constitutional law in the past.
Those who make progressive arguments about constitutional
history fall prey to a different mistake: instead of sanctifying the past as
heritage, they commit themselves to a narrative of improvement that
blinds them to both the threats and possibilities of today. By cutting
themselves loose from the aspects of the past that appear disastrous,
progressives also fail to see that some of the historical forces they think
have been overcome in fact still operate. In the context of racial
equality, for example, a progressive who views the legacy of slavery
and Jim Crow as truly surpassed must believe that only the elimination
of de jure and intentional discrimination was required to overcome this
legacy. He or she must write off the manifold ways that racial hierarchy
continues to reproduce itself. This soft focus on the evils of the past and
present and the tendency to measure the People's success on average
allows progressives to shut their eyes to the possibility that many of the
deserving have failed to win, and will not win in the future. This
threatens to make them complacent, and compromises their ability to
understand and address the needs of the present.
Redemptive constitutionalism is more responsive to both the
present and the past. It seeks to awaken us from the anaesthetizing
narratives of tradition and advance that are promoted by historicism and
progressivism. The redemptive approach to our constitutional past,
unlike the historicist one, can be open to all of the past, because it does
not claim for itself an absolute authority that requires it to invoke
concepts like tradition and heritage. The redemptive historian
approaches the Constitution with a "cautious detachment," but no more
abandons the document than she abandons the past. Redemptivism
openly looks to the present, which Benjamin understands as a moment
of actualization, rather than of time, in order to orient its turn towards
the past. It measures its success not according to notions of finality or
definitiveness, but according to the degree of insight and kind of action
in the present that the historical image enables. A redemptive historian
insists that we cannot view history triumphantly, as if we are on an
11132005]
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eternal and constitutionally ordained path of progress. She is as
skeptical of a belief in progress as she is of narratives of the heritage
and tradition, because both assign agency to somewhere other than the
Jetztzeit, and serve the interests of those who were victorious in the
past. The redemptivist seeks to transcend tradition rather than reify it,
and denies that any history ever fully exhausts the possible meanings of
the past. Rather than claim authority for the past, redemptive arguments
use the past to change our understanding of the present.
We can never rest assured that the evils we have known are not
still with us in some new guise. The past is never fully done with us,
never emptied of its capacity to newly influence the present. Thus, we
must constantly engage in an attempt to make sense of history, rescuing
it from a progressive will to forget. Redemptivism thus seeks to upend
a persistent tendency to reduce constitutional history solely to the
history of doctrine, or majoritarian traditions, and to valorize the
understandings of framers over ratifiers, and ratifiers over "the People"
themselves. The notion of redemption requires us to understand the
Constitution as made up not just of the language and intentions of the
historically dominant, but of a linguistic community. Indeed, we begin
to see the Framers as having borrowed this language from the rest of us,
and from those of us living in the present no less than communities of
the past. Which is to say, the true task of the redemptive
constitutionalist is to "read [the Constitution] that was never written."
The Constitution names "We the People," and this name also has a
claim on us; it requires that we define and redefine it, never considering
it fully made. The word "constitution" itself marks a paradox: It names
our power both to make, or constitute, our own history, and the
inescapable way that we are shaped by, or constituted by, that which
comes before us. 297  Recognizing that historicist and progressive
thinking can perpetuate subordination under the guise of respecting
tradition or believing in progress, the redemptive constitutionalist
brushes history "against the grain. '2 98
Redemptivism is subject to its own series of criticisms. According
to Benjamin's own theory, it ought to welcome and cultivate these. The
first challenge might be called the Cassandra problem; it arises from the
moment in which Benjamin was writing. Benjamin may have been
right that redemptive history was needed in the Weimar Republic, but
wrong that this kind of disruptive program is useful elsewhere or at
other times. Perhaps we are beyond the kind of cautionary tale that
Benjamin tells. But what if we are not? Benjamin would insist that
297 See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167-68
(1987).
298 Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 8, at
257.
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only the spirit of progressivism, or a coldness of heart, could assure us
that we have no need for vigilance now, that there is no one in danger
today. This is particularly true if the forces responsible for injustice in
the past persist and visit us in new guises. Cassandra, we might recall,
was right about the doom she foretold, but cursed to be unable to
persuade others to believe her.
Others will simply reject Benjamin's presentism, insisting that we
do owe a duty to the hallowed past, and that we ought to preserve our
great cultural treasures, rather than brush them against the grain.
Benjamin would say that this view abandons the Jetztzeit and puts both
the present and past in danger. Regarding Benjamin's focus on
actuality, another might object that progressivism and historicism also
allow action in the present, action that respectively soothes and waits,
and defers and consolidates. Such values may have their uses, but
whether we approve of them will depend upon our own judgment of the
urgency of the present. That, in turn, Benjamin insists, is dependent
upon our ability to awaken and shake off the quietist narratives supplied
by historicism and progressivism.
The most important and obvious criticism, in the context of this
Article, is the claim that redemptive history is incompatible with, or
indeed antithetical to, claims to legal authority. Notably, many
redemptive arguments address themselves more to constitutional
politics than to constitutional courts, more to the People than to the
judges. It may be that redemptivism is particularly well suited to claims
made outside or alongside the judicial system, and to efforts to
destabilize, rather than consolidate, legal authority. Siegel and
Spaulding, however, both direct their redemptive histories in part
towards courts, and seek to use their histories not just to disestablish
traditional narratives, but also to create new persuasive, even
authoritative (if not definitive) narratives of constitutional meaning.
Can redemptive arguments rightly carry the legal authority that some
seek for them?
There are good and bad reasons to question the compatibility of
redemptivism with legal authority. One bad reason is that redemptive
histories are not certain enough. The constitutional histories discussed
here show how profoundly mobile claims of constitutional history and
authority are. No history is certain, and no constitutional interpretation
can escape the need to claim an authority of its own, one that is not
simply borrowed from the past.
There are better reasons to question the uses of redemptivism to
legal authority. Is legal authority incompatible with the particularity
and disruptiveness of the redemptive mode? It is commonly said that
20051 1115
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stability in interpretation is of paramount importance to law.299 This
imperative is made manifest in the rule of stare decisis, which purports
to forbid courts to revisit the past or to retell history. As the Supreme
Court noted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, "no judicial system could
do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised
it.' '300 "Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable. ' 30 1 But just one year before,
the Court reminded us that stare decisis is "not an inexorable
command," and cited thirty-three cases which it had overturned in
whole or part over a twenty year period. 302 Instability may thus be as
foundational to legal authority as its counterpart. Perhaps what is
actually fundamental to law is an oscillation between the two.30 3
Redemptivism, then, might be one strategy to mediate this oscillation.
What of the need for consensus? Is it possible that legal authority
is the achievement of the victors that Benjamin so dislikes, and that it
ought to be? Perhaps, but this view is difficult to reconcile fully with
our constitutional understanding. To the extent that we believe
ourselves to be governed by the Constitution, we do so because we
understand it to be our law, not simply the law of those who ruled
before us. A description of law that only accounted for its force and not
for its nomos, to invoke Robert Cover,30 4 would be a poor description of
law.
Let me close by suggesting a few reasons that redemptive practice,
with all of its disruptive, presentist, and foreboding sensibility, might
well be not only proper, but necessary, to constitutional law and to
claims of constitutional authority in the present. First, if Benjamin's
reasoning is right, redemptivism is no less suited to claims of legal
authority than historicism or progressivism. As I have argued above,
there is no mode of history that is certain; only modes that are less
299 See Kay, supra note 107, at 239 (internal citations omitted). Kay writes:
The idea of multiple interpretations of legal rules is plainly at war with this widely held
view of the function of law because it creates uncertainty as to what the law requires
and allows. Thus lawyers and judges have traditionally been much more concerned
with arriving at a single valid interpretation than their literary [or, we might add,
historical] counterparts.
Id.
300 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
301 Id.
302 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
303 As Robert Post points out, "although the practice of constitutional adjudication at times
may and sometimes must depart from doctrinal interpretation, it is a form of interpretation to
which the practice will also inevitably return." See Post, supra note 75, at 28. Post might also
have framed this point in the obverse: Although stare decisis may and sometimes must be
applied, the practice of departure from precedent will always return.
304 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-18 (1983).
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willing to take responsibility for their acts of interpretation. No mode of
history fully authorizes acts of constitutional interpretation.
Redemptivism is unusual in its willingness to lay bare the agency
involved in legal interpretation. Whether this, in turn, is compatible
with law is a question that has long been debated in legal scholarship.
The brief comments about stare decisis above are intended to
foreground a certain skepticism about the claim that certainty is always
more important to law than its opposite.
Second, as discussed in Part II, the fact that we have committed
ourselves, and our Constitution, to dismantling certain forms of status-
based exclusions from citizenship creates particular problems for
attempts to elaborate the meaning of the Constitution historically.
Historicism cannot solve this problem, and so pretends that it does not
exist. Progressivism does the same, by presuming that our past attempts
to liberate were in fact successful. If we were instead to face this
problem in is starkest manifestations, we might conclude that a kind of
redemptivism is necessary to our ability to reconcile the Constitution's
historicity with its contemporary legitimacy.
Finally, the present day legitimacy of the Constitution surely
depends at least in part on our ability to take seriously the tragedies of
our constitutional past, and to capture the imagination of the present.
Our capacity to be true to the historical aspect of the Constitution may
also depend upon our ability to continually re-imagine our relation to
the past, to draw new constellations between past and present. The
redemptive mode of constitutional history holds a dynamic, creative
promise, enabling us to reimagine the relation between past and present
in a way that is responsive to both. Perhaps only by thinking
redemptively can We the People live up to the claim that our
constitutional past has upon us, without relinquishing our responsibility
to chart the waters of our constitutional present.
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